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DRUGI POTOP: THE FALL OF THE SECOND POLISH REPUBLIC
by
Wesley Kent
(Under the Direction of John W. Steinberg)
ABSTRACT
This thesis seeks to examine the factors that resulted in the fall of the Second
Polish Republic and track its downward trajectory. Examining the Second Republic,
from its creation in 1918 to its loss of recognition in 1945, reveals that its demise began
long before German tanks violated Poland’s frontiers on 1 September, 1939.
Commencing with the competing ideas of what a Polish state would be and continuing
through the political and foreign policy developments of the inter-war years, a pattern
begins to emerge - that of the Poles’ search for their place in modern Europe. The lead up
to the Second World War and the invasion of Poland by the German-Soviet Alliance
demonstrates the failure of the Poles to achieve that place. The actions of the Polish
Government-in-Exile during the war embody an attempt to legitimize their claims by
lending all the support at their disposal to the Allied war effort. Yet the entry of the
Soviet Union into the Allied cause proved a death sentence for the Second Republic,
despite the Poles contributions they paled in comparison to those of the USSR. The
London Poles defense of their national territory and people in the face of Soviet demand
aggravated the Western Allies, causing them to see the government-in-exile as
uncooperative and therefore, inconvenient. Due to this, when the time came they were
willing to sacrifice the London Poles to appease Stalin and ensure his continued pledge to
inter-allied unity. The Second Republic emerges from this examination as a victim of the
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circumstances of its time and place. From the beginning the Poles were fighting a losing
battle to regain the position they had lost in the 17th century. In the end, despite their
resistance to Germans and Soviets alike, they were resigned by the Western powers to be
a Soviet puppet state for the next 50 years.
INDEX WORDS: Poland, USSR, Germany, The United Kingdom, The United States of
America, France, The Second Polish Republic, The Polish Government-in-Exile, World
War II, Katyn, Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, The Warsaw Uprising, The Teheran
Conference, The Yalta Conference, The Potsdam Conference, Jozef Pilsudski, Joseph
Stalin, Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt
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INTRODUCTION
The Polish Second Republic
The Second Polish Republic was forged in the dying embers of the First World War; the
Polish people, sensing the demise of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires,
reversed over a century of foreign occupation and established an independent Polish nation in
1918. Tragically, the Second Republic was born into a geopolitically hopeless situation; its very
existence in Europe reliant on factors seemingly outside of its control. The new Poland arose
between the two wounded giants of Germany and Soviet Russia, and its subsequent survival
rested almost entirely on the fallacy of these two nations remaining in their weakened state. The
politics and foreign policy of the Second Republic mirrored the Poles view of themselves as a
reborn great power in the vein of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of the 16th century, a
delusion which blinded them to their true weakness. Europe’s rejection of Poland’s worldview
resulted in the Poles attempting, throughout the 1920s and 1930s, to find their place in Europe
and gain legitimacy both at home and abroad.
Their precarious position in Europe and inexperience with democracy resulted in the
Republics fall into authoritarianism damaging it prestige in the eyes of the West. In foreign
policy, they were unable to find their place in the European power structure due to the threat they
represented to its balance of power. When attempting to negotiate with Germany or the USSR,
Poland’s 1000 year struggle against the two nations produced a mindset where the very idea of
compromise with either power was equated with weakness and national betrayal. Therefore any
Polish territorial concession, a prerequisite for alliance with either Germany or the USSR,
represented submission to foreign domination. The Polish solution of forming alliances with the
appeasing West, throughout the inter-war years, compounded their problems. This left the Poles
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vulnerable and isolated between the growing power of their neighbors. Polish security was,
therefore, built on illusions: that of their strength in comparison to Germany and the USSR and
that of their importance to the West. Though the Second Republic’s standing in Europe was
tenuous at its foundation, as time went by, while Germany rearmed and the USSR industrialized,
its position became less and less secure. The West, simultaneously, began distancing itself from
the Poles, eager to appease Hitler and prevent another great European war. Yet with the
commencement of the Second World War, the Second Republic’s position in Europe became
untenable. With renewed strength, Germany and the USSR stripped the Second Republic of its
territory in September of 1939, forcing its government and military to flee abroad. The entry of
the Soviet Union into the Allied war effort in June 1941 further weakened the Poles' alliances
with the West. The problem of legitimacy, inherited by the Polish Government-in-Exile, was
their greatest weakness, one that the Soviets and the Western Allies were able to exploit to
unilaterally decide Poland’s post-war fate. Consequently, in the face of Soviet demands,
Poland’s position in the Allied camp declined, until they were finally abandoned at the Yalta
Conference in 1945; the Second Republic being sacrificed in the name of inter-Allied unity, a
mirage destined to fall apart in the coming Cold War.
This thesis seeks to examine the factors that resulted in the fall of the Second Polish
1

Republic and track its downward trajectory. Examining the Second Republic, from its creation

1

The historiography of the Polish Second Republic, available in English, can be divided into several major areas.
For a general overview, Gods Playground by Norman Davies is the definitive work, describing the history
of Poland from antiquity to the present day. The Eagle Unbowed, by Halik Kochanski, is a comprehensive
survey of Poland in the Second World War, touching on everything from diplomacy to economics, the
Polish Armed forces to the three great conferences, and the government-in-exile to the German death
camps
The Soviets’ role in the formation of the Second Republic is explored in White Eagle, Red Star: The
Polish-Soviet War, 1919-20, by Norman Davies, which describes the military and political events surrounding the
Polish-Soviet War. Another work is Soviet-Polish Relations, 1917-1921, by Piotr Wandycz, which, conversely,
focuses on the diplomatic battles between the Poles and the Soviets during the same period.
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in 1918 to its loss of recognition in 1945, reveals that its demise began long before German tanks
violated Poland’s frontiers on 1 September, 1939. Commencing with the competing ideas of
what a Polish state would be and continuing through the political and foreign policy
developments of the inter-war years, a pattern begins to emerge - that of the Poles’ search for
their place in modern Europe. The lead up to the Second World War and the invasion of Poland
by the German-Soviet Alliance demonstrates the failure of the Poles to achieve that place. The

The internal fragmentation of the Second Republic’s politics is explored by Joseph Rothschild in his two
works, Pilsudski’s Coup D’état and East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars. Within, Rothschild
chronicles the rise and fall of the Poles’ parliamentary democracy, and its overturning by Joseph Pilsudski’s coup in
May of 1926. Politics in Independent Poland 1921-1939, by Antony Polonsky, also focuses on the inter-war politics
of the Second Republic, showing the failure of the various governments to solidify their power enough to raise
Poland into a position of strength.
Poland’s diplomacy with its Western allies is the subject of two books by Anna Cienciala. In From
Versailles to Locarno, co-written with Titus Komarnicki, Cienciala describes the origins of the Poles’ alliances with
France and the French’s subsequent retreat for this alliance due to pressure exerted by the United Kingdom.
Cienciala’s second book, Poland and the Western Powers 1938-1939, examines Poland’s foreign policy in the leadup to the Second World War and the failure of both the Poles’ policy of equilibrium and their Western alliances.
The suffering of the Polish people during the Second World War and German-Soviet crimes against Polish
citizens is the subject of numerous works. Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, by Timothy Snyder, looks
at the history of the Eastern European borderlands from the end of World War One through the Second World War.
Snyder recounts the seemingly never-ending pattern of slaughter committed by the Germans and Soviets on not only
Poles, but also Jews, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and others. Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and
Atrocity, by Alexander Rossino, inspects the savage conduct of the German war machine during the
September,1939, campaign and shows how German actions in Poland were in many ways a test run for their future
crimes in the USSR. Katyn: A Crime without Punishment, by Anna Cienciala, N. S. Lebedeva, and Wojciech
Materski, provides a wealth of primary documents and analyses of the Katyn massacre of 20,000 Polish officers and
Intelligentsia at the hands of the NKVD in 1940. Looking at the course of the massacre from the Soviet invasion of
Poland to the Russian government’s confession in the 1990s, Cienciala seeks to explain the reasons for the Soviets’
actions.
Poland’s military contribution to the Allied cause in the Second World War is explored in No Greater Ally
by Kenneth Koskodan. In his work, Koskodan recounts in detail the stories of the various Polish Armed Forces
active against the Germans in Europe. Rising ’44, by Norman Davies, is an overview of the Warsaw Uprising of
1944. Davies follows the course of the uprising from its outbreak to its eventual defeat, focusing primarily on the
life of the resistance fighters, the Soviets’ disregard for the uprising, and the Western Allies’ refusal to press Stalin
to aid the Poles.
The Polish Government-in-Exiles’ struggles against Soviet demands and Western pressure to compromise
is the focus of Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, by Edward Raczyński and Stanisław Biegański.
An English translation of many of the government-in-exiles documents from the Second World War, the collection
is a record of the London Poles’ opposition to Soviet demands. In Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland,
Edward Rozek describes the Soviets’ attempts to gain political control of Poland through diplomacy with the
Western Allies. Rozek argues that control of Poland was one of the Soviet Union’s earliest goals and that they used
war with Hitler to gain control of all of Eastern Europe. Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin, by Herbert Feis, looks at the
inner diplomacy of the leaders of the three great powers as they decided the shape of the post-war world. Feis’ work
shows how important the Red Army was to the allied cause and how much the West was willing to give to ensure
continued Soviet involvement in the war against Hitler.
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actions of the Polish Government-in-Exile during the war embody an attempt to legitimize their
claims by lending all the support at their disposal to the Allied war effort. Yet the entry of the
Soviet Union into the Allied cause proved a death sentence for the Second Republic, despite the
Poles contributions they paled in comparison to those of the USSR. The London Poles defense of
their national territory and people in the face of Soviet demand aggravated the Western Allies,
causing them to see the government-in-exile as uncooperative and therefore, inconvenient. Due
to this, when the time came they were willing to sacrifice the London Poles to appease Stalin and
ensure his continued pledge to inter-allied unity. The Second Republic emerges from this
examination as a victim of the circumstances of its time and place. From the beginning the Poles
were fighting a losing battle to regain the position they had lost in the 17th century. In the end,
despite their resistance to Germans and Soviets alike, they were resigned by the Western powers
to be a Soviet puppet state for the next 50 years.

12

CHAPTER I
The Stillborn Republic
The Inter-War Years: 1918-1939

Map 1. “Map of the Polish Second Republic: With Partition Borders” Ancestry.com. “
http://freepages.genealogy.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~atpc/maps/poland-1918.gif, (accessed April 1, 2013)

The origins of the Second Republic’s fall lay long before the opening shots of World War
II. The position in which the Polish state found itself after having won independence was not
enviable. Established in the aftermath of the First World War, the Second Republic was forged
from the remains of three empires, the German Kaiserreich, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and
the Russian Empire, which had all collapsed as a result of the recent conflict. Reclaiming their
independence after 123 years of foreign domination with a series of uprisings, declarations, and
border skirmishes, the Polish people saw their creation gain international recognition at the
Versailles Conference in 1919. With this independence, however, Weimar Germany and the
USSR, the successor states of two of the three formerly partitioning powers, looked on hungrily,
chafing at having so much of “their” former territory torn away from them. This hostility led to
violence even before the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. In what is known as the Powstanie
Wielkopolskie, Greater Poland Uprising, beginning on 27 December 1918 and ending on 15
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February 1919, members of the Polska Organizacja Wojskowa, Polish Military Organization,
many of whom were veterans of the First World War, engaged in armed conflict with the
intention of driving the German occupation forces out of the areas of Poland occupied by
2

Germany since the partitions at the end of the 18th century. Taking advantage of weakened
German moral after the Kaiser’s forced abdication, and the armistice of 11 November, the Polish
3

Military Organization pushed the German forces from Polish lands. The success of the uprising
had far-reaching consequences at the Versailles Conference. The Versailles Treaty awarded the
Poles not only the territory they had won through force of arms, but also territories still under
4

dispute such as the Polish Corridor, the strip of land that gave Poland access to the Baltic. On
their eastern border, things were not so simple.
Most Polish leaders at the foundation of the Second Republic wished to create a large
Polish state, to better protect and foster the economic, political, and military development of the
fledgling nation. There were, however, competing aims on what shape the new Polish nation
should take. Roman Dmowski, the leader of the right wing Narodowa Demokracja, National
Democrat Party, argued for a compact homogeneous Poland made up only of the territory in
5

which Polish Catholics were the majority. The ethnic minorities in these areas would be
6

expelled or subject to “Polonization. ” The Polish leader and Chief of State Marshal Jozef

2

Richard Blanke, Orphans of Versailles: the Germans in Western Poland, 1918-1939 (Lexington: University Press
of Kentucky, 1993), 14-15.
3
Norman Davies, White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919-20 (London: Random House, 2003), 25-26.
4
Anna Cienciala and Titus Komarnicki, From Versailles to Locarno: Keys to Polish Foreign Policy, 1919-1925
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984), 53.
5
Norman Davies, God's Playground, a History of Poland: In Two Volumes: Volume II, 1795 to the Present.
(Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford University Press, 2005), 55.
6
Antony Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland 1921-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 59.
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7

Pilsudski alternatively argued for an Intermarium, between the seas, policy. He sought the
establishment of a Polish-led, democratic, federation of independent states, in the vein of the
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: comprised of the Eastern European nations that were
attempting to establish themselves after the collapse of the three great empires. Only through this
form of collective security and the creation of a “Third Europe” axis could the eastern nations
hope to stand against a future resurgent Germany or Russia.

8

Pilsudski’s early implementation of his Intermarium policy and his attempts to expand
Poland’s borders to their greatest size possible ran into the competing aims of the newly-born
USSR. Having emerged victorious from the Russian Civil War, the Soviet government was wary
of Polish expansion into areas formerly controlled by the Russian Empire, such as Ukraine,
Belorussia, and the Baltic States. These areas had been ceded to Germany by the Bolsheviks at
9

the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to gain breathing space for their own consolidation of power. That
process completed, the Soviet government now looked to regain this lost territory. Additionally,
many Soviet leaders, such as Leon Trotsky, were proponents of exporting the communist
10

revolution to the rest of Europe, namely Germany. Poland was to be the bridge to the West. To
achieve this, the Red Army would first have to make its way through the new Polish State. The
intersection of Polish and Soviet expansion led to the Polish-Soviet War. Lasting from February,
1919 to March, 1921, this back-and-forth struggle eventually saw the Poles emerge victorious,
11

after the Battle of Warsaw (the so-called Miracle on the Vistula). The Treaty of Riga signed 18

7

Davies, God's Playground, 55.
Anna M. Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers 1938-1939 (London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1968), 67.
9
Davies, God's Playground, 284.
10
Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 66-67.
11
Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 223.
8
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March 1921, secured some, but not all of the territory gained by the Poles in the east since the
12

end of the First World War. Even with victory, the Polish-Soviet War ended Pilsudski’s hopes
of an Intermarium federation. The Treaty of Riga left half of Ukraine and Belorussia, vital
partners for the proposed federation, in Soviet hands. Simultaneous minor border conflicts with
13

both Lithuania and Czechoslovakia poisoned relations between the three nations. Though
Poland was able to maintain positive relations with the rest of Eastern Europe, the tensions these
states had with their neighbors rendered it impossible for the establishment of any type of supranational federation. The Western powers also disapproved of the Intermarium policy due to its
shifting of the European balance of power they were trying to maintain. While the eastern Polish
borders, as set by the treaty of Riga, left Poland with a sizable ethnic minority of Ukrainians,
Belarusians, and Jews, the failure of Intermarium led to a policy “Polonization” in the early
14

years of the republic. In many ways a watered down version of Dmowski’s proposed policy of
a distinct Polish state, became the de facto policy of the Polish government in the first half of the
1920s.

15

Polish politics during the inter-war period were marked by the search for an effective
form of government. A conquered people for the past century the Poles would attempted to
develop a functioning political entity to rule their nation. In many ways, however, two decades is
not long enough to foster a spirit of democracy in a people long used to living under an
autocracy.

12

Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 261.
Matthew D'Auria, Europe in Crisis: Intellectuals and the European Idea, 1917-1957 ( New York: Berghahn
Books,2012),191.
14
Davies, God's Playground, 272.
15
Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars (Seatle: University of Washington Press,
1974), 34.
13
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In 1921, the Poles adopted a constitution creating a government modeled on the French
Republic with a strong legislative body, or Sejm, and a weak executive. The latter was an effort
by Pilsudski’s enemies to prevent him from keeping the power he had possessed as chief of
16

state. The government that emerged was chaotic and splintered. The problem of integrating the
remnants of three empires into a single democratic body proved a difficult undertaking.
Due to the Sejm’s proportional representation, Polish politics fell prey to various
fragmented factions, four major and numerous minor parties, each with their own constituents
17

and ideologies that could not agree on any major issue. As in the waning days of the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth, the political infighting and division of the Sejm rendered it unable to
adequately respond to the various problems facing the Polish nation. The numerous wars and
conflicts had devastated much of the Polish territory and the difficulties of incorporating the
18

three economic zones of the old empires into one was a daunting task. The political experience
that many of the Polish politicians had gained while under foreign rule did nothing to aid their
governance of the Second Republic. The Polish parties that had been formed in the legislative
houses of Germany, Austria, and Russia had primarily been concerned with specifically Polish
19

issues, such as redress for political grievances, and agitation for self-rule. Having gained
independence, all their training proved useless and detrimental to the running of a cohesive state.
The Sejm often devolved into special interests and demagoguery, and the grievances of Poland’s
20

ethnic minorities were oft forgotten or ignored. Corruption, resulting from a combination of
political inexperience and heritage from Russia and Austria turned much of the populace away

16

Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 45-46.
Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 96.
18
Davies, God's Playground, 307.
19
Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 509-510.
20
Joseph Rothschild, Pilsudski’s Coup D’état. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1966), 4.
17

17
21

from the very idea of a parliamentary system. The absences of Pilsudski from public political
life, having declined to run for president owing to the weakness of the office, also served to
foster a sense of illegitimacy in the Sejm amongst the common people. Pilsudski possessed a
charisma and following unmatched in Poland due to his role in the establishment of the nation
and his victory over the Soviets in 1920. His public withdrawal from politics after the
assassination of the first elected President of Poland, Gabriel Narutowicz, further weakened
public opinion of the Sejm government.

22

From 1921 to 1925, Poland’s economy showed little sign of improving as unemployment
23

and hyper-inflation remained rampant. The continued corruption and ineffectiveness of the
Sejm led to mass disillusionment with the government. In this political climate, many looked
towards Pilsudski to use his connections in the military and left wing parties to launch a Coup
24

against the Sejm. Pilsudski, disgusted with the inaction of the current government, was
eventually persuaded and on 12-14 May 1926 with the support of the military, the Polish
Socialist Party, Liberation Party, Peasant Party, and even the Polish Communist Party, Pilsudski
overthrew the government of President Stanisław Wojciechowski and Prime Minister Wincenty
Witos with only minor violence.

25

On 31 May, the Sejm offered Pilsudski the office of the

Presidency, but once again he turned it down due to the inherent weakness of the possession.
Instead, one of his colleagues, Ignacy Mościcki, was elected with Pilsudski assuming the office
of PM from 1926 to 1928 and again in 1930.

21

26

Rothschild, Pilsudski’s Coup D’état, 10.
Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 111.
23
Rothschild, Pilsudski’s Coup D’état, 20-21.
24
Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars, 55.
25
Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 171.
26
Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 179.
22

18
Pilsudski did not pursue major reforms and distanced himself from the more
27

revolutionary left that had been his allies in the coup. He did not abolish the Constitution of
1921, only altering it from a parliamentary system into a presidential system with a strong central
28

government. After the coup of 1926, a movement called Sanacja, or sanitation, governed
Poland with Pilsudski as its guiding hand. Sanacja was a political ideology developed by
Pilsudski and comprised of his allies, who were disgusted at the corruption in Poland’s
29

government and the weakness of its economy. It was formed of a coalition of the right, left, and
center that eschewed political parties as only self-serving entities. Sanacja served as the major
force in the Sejm until the initiation of the Second World War.
Effectively, Pilsudski ruled as a strongman or quasi-dictator seemingly working within
the confines of the constitution, but in effect, ruling by decree with the Sanacja controlled Sejm
30

rubber stamping his orders. Additionally, governmental positions were filled with “Pilsudski’s
colonels”, the block of military officers that had formed under the Marshal during World War
One. These colonels saw Pilsudski not as a political leader but as their old commander to whom
absolute obedience was owed. This, coupled with Pilsudski’s general contempt for politicians,
meant that the true governing force in Poland was a small cohesive group of men.

31

Though Pilsudski’s leadership was somewhat authoritarian, it was accepted by many of
the Polish people. The stability it brought allowed the economy to begin its recovery, the rights
of minorities in Poland were protected, and the nation began a process of industrialization.

27

Rothschild, Pilsudski’s Coup D’état, 157-158.
Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars, 57.
29
Rothschild, Pilsudski’s Coup D’état, 362.
30
Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 511.
31
Rothschild, Pilsudski’s Coup D’état, 338.
32
Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 512.
28

32
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Furthermore, fear of the rebuilding Germany and USSR was justification for many that
33

authoritarianism was the only method to protect the nation’s very existence. Problems did arise
in that Pilsudski did not understand that the Sejm would resent illegalities even if they brought
success. Likewise the quasi-dictatorship of Pilsudski brought disapproval by the Western
democracies on the idea of a Polish nation, at a time when Germany was beginning to demand
changes to the post-war order of Europe.

34

Though he did not play much of a role in politics during the last years of his life,
35

Pilsudski’s presence was crucial to the existence and legitimacy of the Polish government. With
his death in 1935, the entire Sanacja movement lost much of its impetus. Pilsudski’s
authoritarian method of governance left him isolated and without peers, meaning, when the time
came to find a replacement, no challenger could come close to matching the force the Marshal
36

had been in Polish politics. The Sanacja movement which had relied completely on Pilsudski
for its ideological content and cohesiveness began to splinter in his absence. Three groups
emerged each claiming to be the successor of Pilsudski’s vision: the left under Pilsudski’s aid
Walery Sławek, the center under President Ignacy Mościcki, and the right under Pilsudski’s
military successor Edward Rydz-Śmigły. Rydz-Śmigły emerged as the next head of the Polish
37

state due to an alliance with Mościcki, and his years in power were marked by clashes with the
Sejm that made the Sanacja movement evolve into far more right-wing authoritarianism than it
38

had ever been under Pilsudski. At the same time Pilsudski’s protection of ethnic minorities was

33

Edward J. Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy (New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), 9.
Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy, 9.
35
Rothschild, Pilsudski’s Coup D’état, 367.
36
Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars, 69.
37
Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland,406-412.
38
Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland,512.
34

20
overturned, and a program of “Polonization” was implemented in regards to Poland’s
39

minorities. With Pilsudski gone, the popular support for the Sanacja government began to
evaporate. Pilsudski’s cult of personality was often evoked by Rydz-Śmigły, but he proved to be
a poor successor to the Marshal.
Since the Coup of 1926 there had been opposition to the Sanacja movement, united
40

primarily by the desire for a return to parliamentary democracy. Pilsudski’s death and the move
to open authoritarianism by his successor reinvigorated the opposition to challenge the
legitimacy of the Polish government. The group that would come to have the most influence
among the opposition was the Morges Front, founded in February 1936 by General Władysław
Sikorski and the former Polish Prime Minister Ignacy Paderewski in the Swiss town of Morges.

41

The Morges Front was backed by the French government who, though they had, in theory, a
binding military alliance with Poland during the 1920s and 1930s, at the same time had been
42

supporting the opposition to Sanacja. Sikorski, a former general in the Polish Army, living in
self-imposed exile in France, had effectively become a French agent, spending his time
43

attempting to rally support away from the pre-war ruling party. By joining with the deposed
Prime Minister Ignacy Paderewski, Sikorski and the Morges Front had a compelling claim to be
the legitimate government of the Polish state. Many Polish politicians fled the Sanacja
movement in the late 1930s to join with the Morges Front, creating a pool of pro-parliamentary
44

Poles outside of Poland. French support of the Front factored into how many in the West

39

Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 460-463.
Davies, God's Playground, 313-314.
41
Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 418.
42
Halik Kochanski,The Eagle Unbowed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 26.
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viewed Rydz-Śmigły government, raising questions about the acceptability of not only the Polish
government but the Polish state.
Poland’s internal struggles were compounded by their international position. The Polish
state lived under the constant threat of a German-Russian alliance, the same alliance that had
45

been responsible for the partitions at the end of the 18th century. Yet the Poles found
themselves isolated in Eastern Europe between the successor states of the former partitioning
powers. The foundational conflicts with Germany and the USSR further soured the already poor
relations between Poland her two neighbors. This, coupled with the historical animosity felt by
the three nations, all but precluded any form of alliance between Poland and the two great states.
Both Germany and Russia claimed much, if not all, of the territory which comprised the new
Polish state, despite the fact that all of the territory, and more, had belonged to Poland before the
partitions at the end of the 18th century. To compound the point, the Germans made their feelings
on the issue official government policy in 1925 at the Treaty of Locarno. There the German
government formally recognized its post-Versailles boundaries in the West, but not the East, an
46

event that led to a damaging trade war between Poland and Germany. Poland’s eastern border,
seemingly settled by the Treaty of Riga was less of a flash point than the West, yet the
persecution of the Poles, marooned inside the USSR, by Joseph Stalin’s government showed the
47

animosity was still alive and well. If the Polish nation was to secure its position through
alliances with either Germany or the USSR, there is little doubt that the allying power would
demand territorial concessions, concessions which would set a dangerous precedent and
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represent a betrayal of the Polish people. Allying with either of their historical foes would be
tantamount to giving up their newly-won independence, relegating them to little more than a
puppet state as they had been in the Polish Congress Kingdom, the regime set up in the aftermath
of the Napoleonic wars comprising of the Polish territory controlled by the Russian Empire.

48

Just as important, any alliance with Germany or Russia would be a betrayal of the Poles’
own worldview. Since the foundation of a true Polish state, identified as the adoption of
Christianity by Mieszko I in 966, the Poles had seen themselves as members of the Western
European community.

49

With their adoption of Catholicism in 966, the links it provided to the

West meant law, art, and philosophy flooded into Poland transforming its feudal organization
50

into what the Poles came to see as an enlightened Republic. Since that time, the Poles have
linked themselves to the West through alliances, royal marriages, and political ideology. In this
light, the Poles’ only option for strengthening their national security was through alliances with
the West. Their preferred choice was their traditional ally, France, and its new ally, England.
France and Poland had been allies as far back as the 16th century, with the marriage of French
princesses to Polish Kings, and grew stronger in the 18th century with the marriage of Maria
Leszczyńska to Louis XV of France. After the partitions of Poland in the 1780s and 1790s,
51

Napoleon’s France established a Polish satellite state, The Duchy of Warsaw, in 1807 out of the
Prussian areas of the partitions. He later expanded the Duchy to include Austrian portions; the
52

Duchy lasting until his fall in 1815. Throughout the 19th century, France was also home to a
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large Polish émigré community and welcomed many refugees from failed uprisings of 1832 and
1863.

53

During the Poles’ struggle for independence in 1918-1920, the French sent arms, support,
54

and a military mission, including a young Charles DeGaule, to advise the Polish Army. France,
after the First World War, was open to the idea of a Franco-Polish alliance as well as a strong
Polish state. With the loss of their Entente ally Russia to communist revolution, France desired a
strong Eastern European power to aid in her defense against any future resurgent Germany.

55

Poland, with its large size and links to France, offered the best option for their policy of
containment. Furthermore France sought to use the Eastern European states, Poland in particular,
as a Cordon Sanitaire to seal off the West from the Bolshevik threat of the USSR.

56

With this in

mind, France and Poland signed the Franco-Polish Military Agreement on 19 February, 1921.

57

The agreement was aimed at threats from Germany and the USSR and assured military action by
both nations if one of the signatories suffered an "unprovoked" attack.
The United Kingdom, however, was a different situation altogether. Due to the threat of
Germany and the USSR, the Poles, in the opening days of their independence, saw expansion to
their geographical limit as the only way to safeguard their national sovereignty. The United
Kingdom, a country with little knowledge of Polish culture, history, or political ideology, saw
the expansion, hypocritically, as rank imperialism which would upset the already fragile balance
of power in Europe. This attempt to maintain the European balance of power, in line with
Britain’s traditional on the continent, was designed to keep Britain’s markets, the basis of her
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prosperity, open. A balance of power for the British, therefore, meant a strong Germany. Polish
expansion, even to the borders established at Versailles was a detriment to the rebuilding of the
58

German economy. As the 1920s progressed, the British became increasingly sympathetic to the
Germans plight. They felt guilt for the harshness of the Treaty of Versailles, and believed that the
59

German-Polish border was unjust. Poland’s western border, the British agreed, could not last.
They also felt that Poland and the Eastern European states were bound to fall under German
control eventually as the east was Germany’s natural sphere of influence, just as the United
60

Kingdom’s was in Western Europe and the Mediterranean. With the signing of the FrancoPolish Military Agreement, the Polish nation was further harmed in the eyes of Great Britain as
they viewed the treaty as turning Poland into a French satellite, just as they had viewed the
Duchy of Warsaw in 1808, thus rousing long dormant fears of French hegemonic ambition in
Europe. This led to diplomatic back-pedaling on the part of the French, who were desperate to
keep the British on the best of terms to form a united front against a weakened, but not
destroyed, Germany. The British, it was decided, were a far better ally to have than the Poles.

61

Starting with the Locarno treaties in 1925, the French began a gradual retreat from their
grand post-war design of containment. Without another great power, i.e. Britain, the French did
not feel strong enough to pursue a policy with Poland and the other Eastern European nations.
Britain’s insistence at Locarno that France abandon their eastern allies in order to normalize
relations with Germany convinced many in Poland, most importantly Pilsudski, that the West
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could not be relied on to insure the survival of the Polish state. The Anglo-French entente and
France’s eastern alliances effectively canceled each other out, weakening both in the process.
France subordination of its foreign policy to that of the United Kingdom hampered their original
policy of containment and forced them to retreat from their post-war Eastern European sphere of
influence, leaving Poland adrift searching for a lifeline.

63

The failure of their western diplomatic gambit all but forced the Poles to reevaluate their
position in Europe. Pilsudski and the Polish Foreign Minister Colonel Jozef Beck’s response was
a policy of equilibrium and an individual action Eastern Europe.

64

This equilibrium was

designed to counterbalance their French allies’ concentration on Western security by means of
Polish actions in the east, thus raising the value of Poland as a French ally and allowing them
65

more say in the allied decision making process. Beck and Pilsudski’s plans also centered on the
idea of self-reliance. As they considered Poland a reincarnated great power, they were
determined to act as a great power, attempting to use their supposed strength as leverage in
dealing with the nations of Eastern Europe. Their successful defense of Warsaw in 1920 and
subsequent counterattack, which despite French supplies was primarily a Polish undertaking,
helped to convince many in the Polish government that their policy of self-reliance was the right
one. In reality there attempts to act as a great power were often interpreted poorly by the West
and led them to overplay their hand, based on the illusion of their own importance.
The foundation of this equilibrium was the attempt to achieve normal and more
importantly neutral relations with both Germany and the Soviet Union. Polish foreign policy
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throughout the next decade consisted of attempts to solidify its national security through a series
of non-aggression pacts. The first major pillar in the Pole’s policy was the signing of the Soviet–
Polish Non-Aggression Pact with the USSR on 25 July 1932. The Pact was to last three years but
66

was later changed to remain in place until 1945. In the agreement, both sides vowed to
renounce violence in their mutual relations, to resolve problems through negotiations, and to
forgo any armed conflict or alliances aimed at the other side. The Soviets desired an arrangement
with the Poles due to the Japanese attack on Manchuria in 1931. Fearing a war with Japan in the
east the USSR was eager to sign a non-aggression pact with Poland to ensure the security of its
67

western border. The success of the agreement for the Poles was two-fold: first it shored-up its
eastern frontier at a time when France, at the behest of Britain, was distancing itself from its
agreements with Poland. Though the Poles saw the Soviet-Polish Pact as in keeping with the
Franco-Polish alliance, as France had also signed such a treaty with the Soviets in 1931.

68

Secondly, the pact with the Soviets strengthened Poland’s position, weakened due to the trade
war, in negotiations with a rapidly rearming Germany.
Indeed, the Poles’ attitude toward their western neighbor was becoming more
complicated as the 1930s progressed. With the rise of the Nazi Party and Adolf Hitler to power
in 1933, the German repudiation of the Treaty of Versailles, their program of rearmament, and
increasing nationalism were watched carefully by the Poles. Pilsudski, now in his later years,
saw the revanchist Nazi party as a future threat to Polish security. His reaction was to propose a
preventive war to France and the United Kingdom, to remove the Nazis from power before Hitler
had further time to rearm. The West’s reaction was one of shock and horror, and they quickly
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refused the proposition. This unwillingness to act against the Germans seriously weakened
Pilsudski’s faith in French aid to Poland and led to a cooling in Franco-Polish relations.
Pilsudski’s fears were compounded by the construction of the Maginot Line, which he foresaw,
correctly as it turned out, as a French signal that in the event of war with Germany, France was
69

to conduct primarily defensive operations. This went against the joint planning that had been in
place since 1921, which consisted of coordinated attacks from France, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia into Germany.
With France seemingly taking itself out of the picture, Pilsudski saw his only recourse as
a non-aggression agreement with Germany to solidify Poland’s western border. Three factors
made such an agreement possible. First, Germany leaving the League of Nations and the
Disarmament Conference enabled Pilsudski to use the international isolation of Hitler’s new
70

regime to approach the Germans from a position of strength. Second was that before Hitler’s
regime, the precondition for the normalization of relations between Poland and Germany had
always been the revision of Poland’s western border. Though Pilsudski was unable to get a
German guarantee on the border’s integrity, Hitler’s isolation and need for time to rebuild
Germany in his image caused him to drop the precondition.

71

Third, was a French proposition to

the Germans claiming that if they concluded a non-aggression pact with the Poles, in return
France would support limited German rearmament and consider German claims to portions of
Poland’s western border.
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Additionally, Pilsudski considered Hitler’s government to be less dangerous to the Polish
state than the USSR. Pilsudski assumed that because Hitler was an Austrian and not Prussian, his
73

claim to Polish territory was more political theater than an actual policy goal. The terms of the
German–Polish Non-Aggression Pact, signed 26 January 1934, were heavily in Poland’s favor.
Both nations swore to resolve all problems through bilateral negotiations and forgo armed
conflict for a decade. A subsequent trade agreement ended the harmful trade war which had
74

existed for the past ten years. To reassure France, the Poles explicitly stated in the treaty that
the pact did not compromise any of their prior international agreements, primarily the FrancoPolish Military Agreement. The treaty was still received poorly in France, with the Poles blamed
for weakening their two-front solution vise-a-vi Germany. Some also charged the Poles with
weakening the Wests policy of collective security by pledging peace with Germany. The truth,
however, was that the West was already sabotaging the idea of collective security by their retreat
from their Eastern European alliances, and their willingness to give in to Hitler’s demands for the
sake of maintaining the peace.
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With Pilsudski’s death in 1935, the Poles lost not only the glue that held their government
together, but also their guiding hand on the international stage. German rearmament, meanwhile,
continued with the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 and turned into geographic
expansion with the Anschluss with Austria in 1938. In both cases, Poland’s Western Allies, for
economic and political reasons, neglected to stop the blatant German violations of the Versailles
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Treaty. As the Nazi Reich attempted to gather all Germans within its borders, Poland, with its
76

sizable German minority, around 100,000 in 1939, looked on with growing concern.
The West’s policy of appeasement, of giving into Hitler’s demands for the sake of
preventing war, seriously alarmed the various Eastern European nations dependent on the West
for their survival. As the West appeased, Beck, now Pilsudski’s foreign policy successor, began
77

to rely more heavily on making unilateral decisions in Eastern Europe. This attempt to survive
autonomously had dire repercussions for the Polish state. Becks policy of rapprochement with
78

the Germans had the effect of making the Poles seem almost an ally of Germany. With French
inaction during the German remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, the basis of its alliance
with Eastern Europe, its willingness to fight, was almost completely undermined. Knowing that
the French would not act, Beck nevertheless informed them that Poland was ready to aid them
militarily in actions against the Germans. At the same time Beck informed the Germans that the
Poles did not object to their actions. Beck’s message to the Germans was soon discovered by the
79

French, heightening suspicion already present due to the Poles’ quasi-fascist government. In
1938, Beck accepted the German Anschluss with Austria, unwilling to speak out due to French
and Italian inaction. By chance, an incident on the Polish-Lithuanian border occurred in the same
week, and Beck used the fear of a Polish-Lithuanian Anschluss to force the Baltic nation to
reinitiate long broken diplomatic relations. Disastrously, this action gave the West the image of
Polish collusion with the Germans.
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The situation further deteriorated with the signing of the Munich Agreement at the
Munich Conference on 30 September 1938 by Germany and the Western powers. The agreement
granted Germany the Sudetenland on the western border of Czechoslovakia, home to a large
German population, in exchange for a guarantee from Hitler that this would be his last territorial
81

demand. The Sudetenland also served as the strategic key to Czechoslovakia’s defense due to
82

the presence of the Czech border forts and much of their armaments industry. Its absorption by
Germany left the Czech state defenseless. Throughout the negotiations, Czechoslovakia, in what
would become precedent for many future negations on Poland, was not consulted.
Poland’s reaction to the Munich Conference was mixed. In the lead up to the conference,
as Hitler was agitating for the cession of the Sudetenland, Beck attempted to pursue a policy of
options. He made demands on the Germans in regards to the Polish minority in Slovakia, in case
the West abandoned the Czechs, while simultaneously restating their agreements with France, on
83

the slim chance that the West would stand against Hitler. With the conclusion of the Munich
conference, on 30 September 1938, Beck issued an ultimatum to the Czechs demanding they
84

cede the territory of Tesche, home to large numbers of Poles. The next day the Czechs
acquiesced and Polish troops entered the territory. Beck’s rationale for the action was twofold.
First, it was primarily meant as a protest against the major powers for being left out of the
conference that decided Czechoslovakia’s fate. Beck’s vision of Poland as the great Eastern
85

power demanded that they be included in such important decisions. The second reason was far
more practical: Beck did not want the Germans to possess a territory with large numbers of

81

Kochanski, The Eagle Unbowed, 40-41.
John Keegan,The Second World War (New York: Penguin Group, 1990), 40.
83
Cienciala, Polish Foreign Policy, 51.
84
Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 476.
85
Cienciala, Polish Foreign Policy, 51.
82

31
ethnic Poles. Aside from nationalism, Beck felt that if the Germans possessed such an area they
could offer to exchange it for the Polish Corridor, the strip of land that connected Poland to the
Baltic, and other territory won by the Poles in the Greater Poland Uprising of 1918. Beck may
have feared that the West would unilaterally agree to such a trade without consulting the Poles
86

just as they had at the Munich Conference. Whatever the reason, the Poles’ seizure of Tesche
stigmatized them in the eyes of the West. To France and the United Kingdom, this was further
87

evidence of collusion between Poland and Germany. Combined with the Poles authoritarian
government; this put the Poles, in the eyes of many, within the fascist camp of Europe.
The charge leveled at Beck, of turning Poland into a German accomplice, does not hold
up to scrutiny. Through he used the Germans’ actions to his advantage, Beck showed no
willingness to form an alliance with Hitler’s government. From 1935 onwards, Hitler had floated
the idea of Poland joining the Anti-Comintern Pact, a proposition repeatedly turned down by
88

Beck. Hitler also sought Polish aid in an attack on the USSR, claiming that the Poles would
gain vast lands in the east, especially Ukraine, in return for giving up their claims to the Polish
89

Corridor. Again Beck declined. Though the West saw Beck as becoming too close to Germany,
in truth, France’s policy of appeasement sabotaged its alliance with Poland. The only option left
to Beck was his rapprochement with Hitler. Due to the German claims on Polish territory, they
could not afford to anger Hitler and were therefore forced into their own version of appeasement.
With Central Europe firmly under its control, Germany began demanding the return of
the Polish Corridor. To push the issue, on 28 April 1939, Hitler withdrew from the German–
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Polish Non-Aggression Pact five years prematurely and began to threaten the Poles with war if
90

they did not acquiesce to Germany’s demands. Beck’s reaction was based on his view of
Poland as a great power. In the face of the growing German threat, he proposed a Third Europe
policy, a continuation of Pilsudski’s Intermarium idea. Believing that Czechoslovakia would
disintegrate after the loss of the Sudetenland, he planned to construct a bloc of Eastern European
states based on an alliance between Poland and Hungary, who would gain a common frontier at
91

the expense of Slovakia. This idea fostered on the illusion of Poland as a great power, was
supposed to create a third bloc in Europe, with the support of the West, to counteract the
German-Italian alliance. This would allow the nations of the east to have more say in the
containment of Germany and ensure there were no further territorial concessions given to Hitler.
The project failed due to disinterest on the part of both the West and the various Eastern
92

nations. More importantly on 15 March 1939, Hitler violated the Munich Agreement and
annexed the rest of Czechoslovakia. With the entire country under German control, this ended
the possibility of a common border between Poland and Hungary, the backbone of Beck’s policy.
The actual result was that Poland now found itself surrounded by Germany on three sides.
In the summer of 1939 the Poles were left with little option but to reestablish and
reinforce their alliances with the Western powers, the same powers that had made clear their
unwillingness to fight. The Poles saw an alliance with the appeasing nations of France and Great
Britain as the only choice available aside from capitulation to one of their neighbors. On 31
March, Poland received guaranties from France and the United Kingdom that Poland’s territorial
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integrity would be defended by the two powers. These efforts were sabotaged on 23 August
1939, when the unthinkable happened. In Moscow the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed
between Germany and the USSR. The agreement vowed non-aggression between the two powers
and pledged the USSR’s noninvolvement in a European war. There were numerous reasons for
the Soviets to sign such a pact. First, the signing meant they might safely deal with the Japanese
94

in the east without the fear of a German-Japanese alliance. Second, was the threat of German
expansion, through war or territorial concessions, to the Soviet border, leaving the USSR’s
heartland without a buffer zone. Third, Stalin new that an invasion of Poland would put
Germany at war with the West, buying time for him to strengthen the USSR, thus the pact was in
95

the best interest of Soviet security. For Hitler, the pact secured his eastern border so that he
could face the Western powers if they decided to stand with Poland, without the threat of falling
96

into a two front war. Yet, it was the pact’s secret protocol that would eventually lead to the
Second Republic’s downfall.
Much has been said about the USSR’s overtures for collective security against the
Germans, and the Western powers attempts to gain such an alliance. In truth, the only Soviet
offer for a defensive pact with the Poles came in 1933, though the offer was only an attempt to
97

sabotage the current Polish-German rapprochement. Nevertheless as the summer of 1939 went
on, there were attempts made to prevent a European war by means of an alliance between the
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West and the USSR. British Prime Minister Chamberlin, the architect of Munich, desired a
general defensive pact with the Soviets. Their asking price was a free hand in the Baltic States,
through which they feared a German attack might come. Chamberlin was unwilling to grant such
demands, not trusting the Soviets to stop their expansion in the Baltic, and fearing that such
expansion could be the cause of the war he was currently attempting to prevent. Mainly, his
unwillingness to conclude a defensive pact with the Soviets was because he still believed that he
could reach some kind of agreement with Hitler.

98

The Poles, for their part, were unwilling to join in any alliance with the USSR that would
allow Red Army troops on Polish soil. Despite French insistences that they accede to Soviet
demands the Poles refused stating that allowing the Soviets to garrison Polish territory would be
99

the same as letting the Germans garrison Alsace and Lorraine. Though Polish hesitation was a
minor part of the breakdown in negotiations, it was a convenient scapegoat for the West’s
withdrawal.
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While the Soviets seemingly sought collective action with the West,

simultaneously they were conducting negotiations with the Germans.

101

Stalin may have been

using his negotiations with the West as leverage in his talks with Germans. Just as in the West,
Polish hesitation was a useful scapegoat for Stalin to explain his failure to conclude an alliance
with the West. Though Poland’s distrust of the USSR was used as a pretext for the breaking of
Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations, the truth is that even had they agreed to a Soviet alliance, not
that it was ever offered, it is unlikely that the USSR would have stood without corresponding
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declarations of firm action from the West.

102

The Soviets’ goal was always to buy time to

strengthen the USSR for the eventual conflict with Germany. An alliance with Poland might
have precipitated a war with the Germans without the aid of the West. By allying with Hitler, the
Germans would turn their vision West where, in Soviet terms, the capitalist nations could
exhaust themselves leaving the USSR in a position of strength.
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If Hitler proved a danger to the

Soviet Union, Stalin understood that the Western Allies would always welcome him into their
fold, he could join them any time he wished.

104

Even with the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, on 23 August, the Poles and the
British signed the Polish-British Common Defense Pact which, with the almost two decade old
Franco-Polish Military Alliance, formalized the military alliances implicit in the Allies 31 March
guaranties.

105

Despite the alliance, in France there was a split in the cabinet over what the French

reaction to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact should be. Some advocated the immediate mobilization
of the French Army to show solidarity with the Poles. Others wanted to renege on their
guarantees to Poland due to the absence of the USSR from the equation.
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The British alliance with Poland was not a friendly one but one born of necessity. With
the failure of appeasement, it was realized that a conflict that would revise the European balance
of power was inevitable. The British were adamant that the battle must be fought outside of the
United Kingdom; the treaty with Poland would ensure that.
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Poland’s resistance would

therefore divert Germany’s attention and buy time for the United Kingdom to ready for battle in
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the West. Yet even at this late hour the Western Allies were still willing to give in to German
demands. Though the Polish-British Pact had already been signed, members of the British
cabinet suggested such plans as an Anglo-German declaration eschewing aggression as a means
to policy or offering the Germans territory in Africa in exchange for dropping its claims in
Eastern Europe.

108

These pleas only convinced Hitler that the United Kingdom was not serious in

its guaranties and would not stand against him if he moved on Poland. Even as late as September
2, a day after the conflict had begun, the United Kingdom still hoped for an armistice and a
Munich style conference to grant Hitler’s demands.

109

Yet by this time it was too late, German

troops were already engaging the Poles inside the Polish borders.
The Second Polish Republic was born into a fatal position. The glory days of the
Commonwealth were far behind them, destroyed by over a century of foreign rule. Poland’s
mission in the inter-war years can, therefore, be described as an attempt to establish its legitimate
place on the European stage both in its internal politics and its foreign policy. The Poles
experiment-with-democracy failed due to the position they found themselves in. Formed from
the remnants of three great autocratic states, they had insufficient time to foster a healthy
democracy. With corruption, economic woes, and mass disillusionment with a parliamentary
government, the Poles turned to authoritarianism to provide stability both at home and abroad. In
doing so, they weakened their claims to legitimacy in the eyes of the Western powers in a Europe
that was quickly splitting into fascist and anti-fascist camps. Their attempts to act as a great
power in the east only weakened their already tenuous position in Europe, their victories against
the Germans and the Soviets after the First World War drawing them into the illusion of strength.
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Yet a Poland stuck between a resurgent Hitler and Stalin had little hope of survival. Furthermore,
they relied on the West to aid them in their continuing existence, unaware of how hollow the
seemingly mighty nations of France and Great Brittan truly were. The First World War impacted
the Western Powers in a way that the Poles did not understand. Whereas Poland won its
independence as a result of the conflict, the only result seen by the West was the loss of an entire
generation of its youth. Such nations were not willing to risk another war for an Eastern
European “backwater.” In this way, the Polish nation was doomed from the start. It is said that
successful diplomacy relies on their being choices, yet, in many ways the Poles had none.

110

Their only options were an alliance with one of the former partitioning powers, which meant
their continued existence as a vassal state, or an uncertain alliance with the West. Beck’s attempt
to limitedly pursue both only resulted in Poland becoming the last of Germany’s victims while
simultaneously causing the Western powers to see the Poles as turning into an ally of Germany.
While it is true that a policy of attempting to maintain the status quo may have been more
successful than trying to independently assert Poland’s great power status, it too was doomed to
failure so long as the great Western powers refused to back up their words with force.
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CHAPTER II
The Fourth Partition
The German-Soviet Invasion of Poland: 1939-1941
Polish defense plans against a German invasion originated in the early 1930s with the rise
1

of the Nazis. Pilsudski’s rapprochement with the Germans was designed, at least in part, to give
2

the Poles time to better prepare themselves for an eventual war with Germany. Poland’s military
at the beginning of the decade was among the most modern and effective armies in Eastern
Europe. It had an army of well over half a million men with modern small arms produced in
3

Poland. From their French allies they inherited a formidable artillery force and doctrine and
4

possessed modern anti-tank guns and rifles. In terms of armor, the Polish military had,
unfortunately, fallen prey to the Tankette (small two-man tanks) fever that was sweeping much
of Europe. They had up-to-date Tankettes, but they would come to learn, just as the British and
Italians would, the weakness inherent in the design, most importantly their poor speed and
5

maneuverability, and lack of anti-armor capability. The Poles also retained a large number of
cavalry divisions, mostly mounted infantry, amounting to around 10% of their army. These
horse-mounted troops had proven invaluable during the Polish-Soviet War for their ability to
6

move swiftly through terrain that was impassable to motorized weapons. In the sky, Poland had
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7

an air force composed of modern aircraft and well trained pilots. Such was the strength and
confidence of the Polish military that twice in the early 1930s, the Poles had proposed to the
French plans for a joint preemptive invasion of Germany, first by Pilsudski in 1933 in reaction to
8

German rearmament and again by Foreign Minister Beck in 1936 in reaction to the
9

remilitarization of the Rhineland. Both times the horrified French refused to mobilize. By 193738, however, the Polish military had begun to lag behind. The weakness of their economy
precluded them from keeping up with most of the technological advancements of the other great
10

powers. In contrast with the Germans, who completely rebuilt their military into a modern
fighting force, the Poles were forced to pick and choose what they would invest in. Nevertheless
in late 1938 and 1939 Poland began to upgrade its military to more modern equipment, starting
11

with their 7TP Tank, a design superior to most German tanks at the time. Unfortunately, by the
beginning of hostilities, the Poles had managed to build only 140 of 7TPs, leaving it vastly
outnumbered by the German armored forces.
Despite these deficiencies, the Polish plan for resisting a German invasion was an
ambitious one. As most of Poland’s wealth and industry was located in the westernmost area of
the country, this was the area that must be defended. The problem was that from the border with
Germany to the Vistula River, in the middle of the country, the terrain was almost completely
open fields with no geographic features that aided in the defense of Poland. With this in mind,
many, including foreign advisors, pushed the Poles to abandon the western portions of their
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nation and deploy defensively behind their rivers. The Polish high command was vehemently
opposed to such a strategy because of the importance of the western territories to the Polish war
effort. Moreover, a retreat from the areas claimed by Germany might give the Western Allies the
13

opportunity to make a separate peace with Hitler just as they had in the Munich agreement. The
Polish General Staff’s solution to this problem was dubbed Plan Zachód, Plan West. Predicting a
German assault towards Warsaw or Gdansk, the Poles planned to defend their western borders
from the outset and conduct a slow, steady fighting retreat to their eastern defenses while the
reserves of the Polish Army mobilized for a counterattack against the advancing Germans.

14

Crucial to Plan West was the Poles’ alliances with France and the United Kingdom. The plan
called for the Poles to hold the Germans in place while the French and British, honoring their
promises to the Poles, would launch offensives into western Germany, forcing the Wehrmacht to
redeploy many of its troops to the West. This would allow a Polish counterattack to push the
Germans back.

15

Plan West had taken a serious hit, however, in March, 1939, when the Germans annexed
the remainder of Czechoslovakia. The Germans now outflanked Poland. With German armies
able to strike from the East Prussia in the north, Germany proper in the west, and Slovakia in the
south, Poland’s Plan West was untenable. While Polish strategists still expected the main
German thrust to come from Pomerania, with any attack coming from the north or south being a
16

minor diversionary action, what the Poles had failed to realize, was the true strength of the
German military. On the eve of World War II, Germany mobilized 60 Infantry divisions, 5800
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guns, 2500 tanks, and 2315 aircraft - a total of one and a half million men against Poland. This
compared to Poland’s 39 Infantry Divisions (of which many never completed mobilization),
17

2065 guns, 615 tanks, and 400 aircraft - a total of 950,000 men. Furthermore, the German
Armed Forces were well trained and ready for a modern type of warfare relying on piercing
armor attacks and coordinated air power as the primary instruments of battle, as opposed to the
18

Poles who, like the rest of the world, saw these as support for infantry formations. The sheer
size of the Wehrmacht also allowed them, in contrast to Polish thinking, to attack with three
strong armies from the north, west, and south.
Polish problems were compounded by their reliance on the West for action. For the
French the Poles were all that was left of France’s collective security dream of the early 1920s.

19

Their attempts to placate their British allies by distancing themselves from such a policy looked
to have backfired. Effectively the French decided to back Poland because they had no other
option. In May of 1939 at the Franco-Polish staff talks, the French promised that, in the event, of
war their army would begin a limited offensive against Germany within three days of
mobilization, with the goal of relieving pressure on the Poles. Once mobilization was complete,
20

about 16 days after it began, the French would begin major offensive operations. Yet, as
Pilsudski feared, the French saw the coming war as a repeat of the last - a war of attrition that
would evolve into trench fighting. Therefore, their planning was almost entirely defensive21

minded when it came to operational strategy. The British were not much better; while planning
to putt troops on the continent, they were inclined to stay on the defensive with the French until
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subject to German aggression. Instead the British planned to bomb Germany in retaliation for
22

bombing Poland. Their promises of offensives to the Poles had been little more than lies.
Neither the French nor the British had any plans for large scale actions against the Germans.
Indeed, there is evidence that the West never had any intention of saving Poland in 1939. Poland
role in the Allied grand strategy, unbeknownst to the Poles themselves, was to provide breathing
23

space for the West. The French and British expected the Poles to last three to four months, in
which time the Anglo-French allies could marshal there forces and confront the German war
24

machine at a later date. The Poles were not informed of these developments and went ahead
with Plan West in the understanding that the Western Allies would honor their promises to begin
offensive operations against Germany’s western frontier. As the Chief of the British Imperial
General Staff Edmund Ironside stated, “The French have lied to the Poles in saying they are
going to attack. There is no idea of it.”

25

The West hindered the Poles’ war-planning in another way as well. Throughout the late
summer and early fall of 1939, the West pressured the Polish government to stall the
26

mobilization of its army in an effort to avoid the appearance of provoking the Germans. Yet, at
the same time that France and the United Kingdom were issuing these pleas, the Wehrmacht was
already poised on the Polish border. When the hammer fell, the Polish Army had mobilized only
half of its divisions.
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Map 2. “Map of German and Soviet Invasions of Poland: September 1939”
Probert, Matt and Leela. 1993 - 2013 The New Society for the Diffusion of Knowledge Southampton, United
Kingdom - http://www.probertencyclopaedia.com/photolib/
maps/Map%20of%20Polish%20Campaign%201939%201966.jpg (accessed April 23, 2013).
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The hammer did fall on the night of 31 August 1939, when members of the German SS
dressed as Polish troops seized the Gleiwitz radio station on the Polish border and began
27

transmitting anti-German propaganda in Polish. The Gleiwitz operation was one of a number of
artificial casus belli created by the Germans as an excuse for their invasion. The first overt act of
war occurred at 4:40 AM on 1 September 1939, when the German Luftwaffe attacked and
destroyed 75% of the Polish village of Wieluń, a target with almost no military value, killing
28

1,200 civilians, an ominous portent of German conduct in the coming war. Five minutes later
the German battleship Schleswig-Holstein, anchored in the harbor under the pretext of a courtesy
visit, opened fire on the Polish transit depot at Westerplatte in Danzig.

29

As 1 September

unfolded, German armies struck into Poland from the north, west, and south, without a formal
declaration of war. Polish forces resisted fiercely for the first few days in what is known as the
Battle of the Borders, fighting night and day without rest to hold back the Germans.

30

On 3 September, France and the United Kingdom declared war on Germany but offered
31

little more than words to support the Polish forces in the field. Over the next week, in the face
of superior numbers and German armored formations, the Poles were pushed back further into
their territory. German armored spearheads cut Polish formations into disjointed pieces, throwing
off any coordination, and leading to portions of the same unit attacking and retreating at the same
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time. By 7 September, German forces were in the outskirts of the Polish capital of Warsaw. At
this time, the Polish Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły, abandoned the failed
Plan West and ordered a general retreat to the south and east, at the same time moving the Polish
government to more defensive terrain around the Romanian border, the so called Romanian
33

Bridgehead. His new plan was to use the area’s mountainous terrain and rivers to nullify the
advantage of the German armored divisions and hold out until winter and beyond awaiting the
promised Western offensive to begin. The Poles treaties with Romania would allow them to
receive supplies from their allies through ports on the Black Sea.

34

This plan, however, became obsolete on 17 September 1939, seventeen days after the
German invasion, when the USSR, as agreed upon in the secret protocols of the MolotovRibbentrop Pact, commenced a westward invasion of the Polish Republic. Since the initiation of
hostilities, the Germans had repeatedly requested the Red Army begin operations into Poland.

35

The Red Army was already positioned along the Polish border waiting for the command to go.
Yet the Soviet government was adamant in resolving its five month undeclared war with Japan in
the Far East before beginning operations into Poland. This resolution came on 15 September,
when Ambassadors Molotov and Shigenori Tōgō signed an agreement, the Nomonhan Cease36

fire, ending the hostilities on 16 September 1939. The next day Stalin ordered the invasion of
Poland. Rather than using false pretense to justify their invasion, the Soviets chose to employ
political cover. A telegram from the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov to the German ambassador
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46
in Moscow stated that with the imminent defeat of the Polish Army, the Soviets feared that a
political vacuum would emerge in the eastern portions of Poland. With this political cover the
Soviet Union invaded Poland claiming that they were doing so to end the intolerable political
and economic conditions under which the national minorities in the borderlands were forced to
37

live. The pretext for the Soviet’s aggression, protecting the Ukrainians and Belarusians living in
Poland, mirrored many of the German’s claims to Polish territory.
Yet the official reason for the Soviet invasion, delivered to the Polish embassy in
Moscow on 17 September, stated that Warsaw was surrounded and ready to capitulate to the
Germans; therefore, it was no longer the capital of Poland. In addition, the whereabouts of the
Polish government were unknown and their armies were in flight. As such, the Soviets declared
that the Polish government had abandoned its people, meaning that the Polish state had ceased to
exist, and any treaties, such as the Polish-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, signed between the
former Polish state and the USSR were void. The Soviet Union therefore laid claim to the eastern
border lands in order to prevent any contingency that might transform them into a threat to the
USSR.

38

The Polish war effort, already reeling from the German invasion and the inevitable

failure of Great Britain and France to uphold their military treaties, was compromises by the
Soviet invasion. The Polish high command ordered the Polish military in the east to withdraw
without molesting the Soviet forces; however, some units refused the orders leading to some
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small battles, to which the Soviets responded with massacres and atrocities, especially targeting
Polish commissioned and non-commissioned officers.

39

Sandwiched in between the advancing German and Soviet Armies, the Polish forces in
the field began to disintegrate. By 29 September, Poland’s fate was sealed; the remnants of the
Polish Army in the field were retreating south, following the Polish government into Romania,
40

and from there making their way west to France to reform and continue the fight. In the entire
campaign, which lasted slightly over a month, the Poles lost almost one million soldiers killed,
wounded, and captured. More disturbing was the almost 200,000 civilian dead left in the wake of
41

the German attack. In the first instance of Hitler’s ruthless racial war for lebensraum, living
space, against the people of Eastern Europe Germans treated Polish citizens that fell into their
path as sub-human, using atrocities to forestall civilian resistance and attacking fleeing refuges
42

with their air force. Even more frightening was the implementation of Operation Tannenberg,
the systematic extermination of over 20,000 Polish intellectuals, clergy, activists, and politicians
in the wake of the advancing Wehrmacht. The SS units responsible for the massacres, the
forerunners of the Einsatzgruppen, used their experience in Poland to perfect the methods they
would later use in the extermination of Jews during Operation Barbarossa.

43

The speed at which the Germans pushed the Polish Army back, and indeed the rapidity of
the invasion itself has led to a number of myths about the entire September Campaign. The most
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famous and longest lasting is the myth of Polish cavalry charging German tanks with nothing but
sabers and lances. This myth was derived from a successful Polish cavalry attack on German
infantry at the Battle of Krojanty , who were then counter-attacked by German armored cars. The
rumor that the Poles had attacked the armor was begun by the Germans, with the help of an
44

Italian war correspondent, as a propaganda attack on the Polish military. In reality the Polish
cavalry, the elite of the Polish Army, was trained to use their horses for maneuver then dismount
and fight on foot. Only against targets of opportunity were they trained to attack while mounted,
45

which they did on many occasions in September 1939. In addition, the Polish cavalry had
towed anti-tank weapons and carried the most effective anti-tank rifle in the world at that time.
The Polish cavalry formations served effectively as mobile reserves and excelled in covering the
Polish Army’s retreats. They proved to be among the ablest of formations the Poles possessed in
the September campaign.

46

Another myth that still is published in military literature, such as John Keegan’s, The
47

Second World War is that the Polish Air Force was destroyed by the Luftwaffe while still on the
ground in the wars opening hours. In reality, the Polish Air Force had been, in the weeks before
1 September, removed from its military bases to camouflaged airfields in the Polish countryside
48

in order to prevent their destruction before they could be employed. Though only a third the
size of the Luftwaffe and vastly outclassed by the advanced German fighters, the Polish air force
actively fought against the Germans throughout the campaign until ordered to retreat into
Romania and make their way to France. Though outnumbered three-to-one, the Polish pilots,
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among the best trained in the world, managed to shoot down or damage beyond repair some 560
49

German planes, 25% of the Luftwaffe’s air power at the loss of 330 aircraft. The Polish pilots
that escaped to France would fight there in June of 1940, and later, flying alongside British,
French, Norwegian, Czech, Slovak, Dutch, Belgian, American, and Commonwealth pilots,
would be instrumental in the Allied victory in the Battle of Britain.
A third myth is that the Polish military was broken quickly and offered little resistance to
the German Armed Forces. Being the first campaign of the Second World War and one that was
isolated from the West, the course of the fighting is not well known, and the speed at which the
Poles were defeated in the field seemed astonishing. This, however, does not hold up to scrutiny.
The Poles won many battles against both the Germans and the Soviets, but, without any support
50

or coherent overall strategy, they were unable to exploit any of their victories. Over 16,000
Germans were killed in the fighting, while the Poles suffered the loss of some 66,000 men
51

defending their homeland. The outnumbered Polish defenders held out for over a month against
the German onslaught and the Soviet invasion. France and the United Kingdom only held the
Germans alone for a little over a week longer even though they possessed superior numbers of
men and equipment.

52

The question then becomes; why was the September campaign so great a defeat for
Poland? Poland’s own military deficiencies must take much of the blame. Their flawed and
outdated overall strategy, Plan West, weakened the limited strength of their military by
attempting to defend the entirety of their western border. Compounding this was their failure to
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realize the scope of the German attack and the size of the forces that Germany would employ.
Most importantly, the Poles were expecting to fight a different type of war. France and the
United Kingdom were expecting a replay of the trenches of World War One, and Poland was
expecting a war similar to their conflict with the USSR in 1920. In reality, they became the first
53

victim of a new type of war, which would come to be labeled blitzkrieg. Against the German’s
fast moving combined arms armored and air attacks, the Poles found their tactical and strategic
weapons to be obsolete, just as the West would discover for themselves in June 1940.
Poland’s’ inter-war economy was able to build a first class army in the late 1920s, but
was unable to modernize and support a military machine able to stand up to a rearmed Germany,
let alone the USSR as well. Had they better employed their forces, perhaps they may have been
able to meet the advancing Germans on more favorable terms. Yet this strategy would have
necessitated the abandonment of the western portion of their nation, a massive political and
economic sacrifice. The pre-war emphasis of the Polish command on tactical and strategic
improvisation at the expense of trained doctrine also hindered Polish efforts to resist their foes.

54

The breakdown in command structure and communication caused by the piercing German
armored thrusts rendered the Polish command incapable of organizing any joint operations onthe-fly as they had trained to do during the past decade.
Just as responsible for the campaign’s failure was the inactivity of the Western powers.
Though the majority of Germany’s military strength was engaged in Poland and despite the
military agreements between the Poles and the West, the only major operation by the Allies was
the French Saar offensive, from 7 to 16 September, in which 40 French divisions, along a 16
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mile front, drove 5 miles into Germany before withdrawing. Though Some French did urge an
56

all-out offensive against the Germans, these voices were in the minority. The United Kingdom
resigned itself to flying bomber missions over German cities, with the aircraft dropping leaflets
rather than bombs.

57

The West’s lack of action seemingly proved Hitler’s statement that France and the United
Kingdom would not truly fight for Poland correct. The German military was free to focus all of
its attention on Poland without having to worry about its western border. As Walther von
Brauchitsch, commander of the German Military, had sated in the first week of September,
58

“every day of calm in the West is for me a gift from god.” Without an Allied offensive into
Germany, the pre-war Polish plan and indeed the retreat to the Romanian bridgehead were
doomed to failure. Despite the promises, guaranties, and assurances that France and the United
Kingdom had given the Poles all throughout the summer of 1939, when the conflict actually
began the West failed to honor their word, deciding to use Poland’s resistance to buy time. For
the Poles, their reliance on the West proved a major weakness from which there was no obvious
solution. This Western inactivity even after the fall of Poland led into what is called the Phony
War from September 1939 to May 1940, where despite numerical and technical superiority, the
Allies refused to launch a major offensive against Germany.
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Perhaps the greatest single reason for the speed with which Poland was defeated was the
intervention of the USSR. With two of the most powerful nations in the world conspiring to
subdue them, the Polish military could not successfully resist. Without a Soviet invasion, it is not
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impossible to believe that the Poles might have held the Romanian bridgehead, with its defensive
terrain, hidden supply caches, and access to the reserves forming in eastern Poland until winter.

60

Yet the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact represented a diplomatic coup, and in hindsight, a death knell
for the Polish Second Republic. Becks policy of equilibrium had proved a failure, the isolation it
had engendered keeping Poland from finding its legitimate place in Europe. Just as in the past,
the German and Russian states had put aside their numerous issues to focus on the one thing they
both agreed upon - the destruction of an independent Polish state. After securing their armistice
with the Japanese, the Soviet invasion of Poland proved the fatal stroke to the Poles military
resistance. The Soviets effectively used Poland just as the Western Allies had, a way to buy time
and space. Stalin knew that he would most likely have to fight Hitler at some point. By allying
with the Germans over the corpse of Poland he ensured that Hitler would turn to the West rather
61

than continue on against the USSR. Stalin’s deal bought the USSR two years to prepare for
conflict against the Germans, and ensured that the opening battles of the war would be fought in
Eastern Europe not in the heart of European Russia. Poland, however, was to pay the price for
both the West and the USSR’s breathing space.
With the campaign lost, the Polish government crossed into Romania. They did so with
the repeated verbal guaranties of the Romanian government that they would be given aid and
62

access to the Black Sea from which they could make their way to the West. This was in keeping
with the numerous treaties and agreements signed between the two nations in the inter-war years,
most notably the Treaty on Mutual Assistance Against Aggression and on Military Aid, signed 9

60

Zaloga, Poland 1939, 11.
Rozek,Allied Wartime Diplomacy,31.
62
Kochanski, The Eagle Unbowed, 90.
61

53
63

February 1927. As they headed south, the Poles received word from their allies that they were
welcome to come and reform their government in France. Yet, due to pressure exerted by Hitler,
the Romanians reneged on their verbal and written agreements. They detained and separated the
members of the Polish government as well as disarming and interning the Polish military that
had escaped into the country.

64

The Western governments made little effort to persuade the Romanians to release the
internees, and it is unlikely that the Romanians would have complied due to the Germans
threatening military action against them. Due to this the, pre-war president, Ignacy Mościcki saw
no choice but to resign the office in order for an exile government to form in France to take over
the responsibilities of governance. What allowed this to occur was the fact that the Polish
constitution was very flexible. It foresaw the possible need of a government-in-exile and
contained nothing that would prevent the existence and function of a state authority outside of
65

the nation’s borders. Having been conquered and partitioned many times before in their history,
it is no wonder that the Poles would have rules in place to keep the state operating if it were to
happen again.
Mościcki’s first choice to replace him as president was the Polish Ambassador to Italy,
General Bolesław Wieniawa-Długoszowski. Shockingly, after being nominated on 25
September, the next day the French government and the Polish politicians already present in
France, led by General Władysław Sikorski and members of the Morges Front, refused to
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recognize him as president. Wieniawa-Długoszowski’s had been one of Pilsudski’s colonels,
66

Pilsudski’s personal aide-de-camp, and had assisted the Marshal in the organization and planning
of the 1926 coup. This put him firmly in the tradition of the pre-war Sanacja government - the
same government Sikorski and other Polish politicians in France had opposed.
Due to the Franco-Polish front against the Sanacja government, it became readily
apparent, as the government-in-exile began to form, that it was to be made up primarily of the
pre-war opposition, the French backed Morges Front in particular, rather than members of the
Sanacja.
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There are two reasons for this development. First, France and the United Kingdom

were home to large numbers of Poles that had fled or been deported from Pilsudski’s Sanacja
Poland. Consequently, the Poles living in the West, as well as the Western governments
themselves wanted the new Polish Government-in-Exile to represent a more democratic
68

government than that possessed by pre-war Poland. Indeed the French decision to exclude
Sanacja members from the forming Polish Government-in-Exile was in keeping with their interwar policy towards Pilsudski’s government. Though France had, in theory, a binding military
alliance with Poland during the 1920s and 1930s, they had at the same time been supporting the
69

opposition to the Sanacja. The fall of Poland offered both France and the pre-war opposition
the perfect chance to end Sanacja rule. Second, the pre-war government, with its primarily
Sanacja membership, was interned in Romania unable to play a further role in Polish politics.
Other politicians, due to their perceived lack of importance, were able to escape and make their
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way to France. France, in many ways, was attempting to mold the shape of the Poles post-war,
perhaps in order to ensure a Poland that was more subservient to French interests and less
independently minded. Indeed there is some evidence that the French government, in order to
further their goal of changing the Polish government, even exerted pressure on the Romanians to
keep the pre-war government incarcerated and therefore off the political stage. Additionally, by
warning their preferred Polish leaders of the so called “Romanian Trap” the French made sure
that the Polish politicians they desired made it to the West. 71
In this climate, after deliberation in Paris, former President of the Polish Senate
Władysław Raczkiewicz was put forward as the preferred candidate. Raczkiewicz was chosen
72

due to his moderate stance and in order to bridge the gap between the pre-war divide. The
Western Allies also accepted his nomination and on 30 September 1939, President Mościcki
resigned his position; Raczkiewicz, already in Paris, was sworn in as the first President of the
Polish Government-in-Exile. Among his first orders was to appoint Sikorski as Prime Minister.
The appointment of the moderate Raczkiewicz as president and of Sikorski, an old
opponent of Pilsudski’s government, as Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish
Armed Forces, represented a complete break from pre-war Poland. Many members of the
military, especially its officer corps, were angered at the change in leadership. The new
government, however, claimed that the change was not an alteration but a restoration. The
government-in-exile being made up primarily of the pre-war opposition to Sanjacia, could claim
that they represented the legitimate Polish government that had been overthrown in Pilsudski’s
coup. By claiming these democratic roots, they could also claim the support of the Polish people
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for their governance. Yet from the start, Sikorski compounded the internal problems of the
government-in-exile. When appointing his cabinet, he deliberately made it larger than necessary
in an attempt to include members of every major pre-war party, thus representing every shape of
political opinion. In all, the government had 22 representatives on its national council primarily
of opposition members but also including those remaining Sanacja members who had managed
73

to escape from Romania. This resulted in a disjointed government whose lack of unity would
cause many instances where no course of action could be decided. The government-in-exile,
effectively, had created for itself the same problem that the Sejm had possessed in the early
1920s. The very gridlock and partisanship that had precipitated the May Coup had been
reestablished by Sikorski leading to the same lack of action on important issues.
Internal problems aside, the position that Raczkiewicz and Sikorski found themselves in
was not enviable; they represented a government without a country and were at war
simultaneously with two of the most powerful nations in the world. They did possess a small
navy, air force, and army which were quickly being reorganized for the defense of France and
operations in Norway. Though small, this force represented the third largest Allied contingent
behind the militaries of France and the United Kingdom. Additionally, the government-in-exile
was recognized by these nations as well as the United States as the legitimate government of
74

Poland. Aside from directing their troops to aid in the Allied cause, a failing proposition which
forced the government-in-exile to relocate from Paris to London, the Poles spent much of their
time in discussions with the Allies regarding the reestablishment of Poland at the end of the war
and denouncing Soviet actions in their occupied country.
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The destruction of the Polish nation in September 1939 was the first decisive step in the
fall of Second Republic. With the loss of their territory, and therefore the source of their power,
the new Polish Government-in-Exile was almost solely reliant on the support of their Western
Allies. In reality, all of the Allies’ promises and words could do nothing to aid them. The speed
at which Poland fell and the reshaping of its government by outside forces also damaged the
reputation of the Polish government, painting them as a collection of inept puppets. The Poles
reliance on the West to safeguard their independence, coupled with their own overblown image
of their own power mean that when Hitler decided he would have his war, Poland stood little if
no chance. The intervention of the Soviets into Eastern Poland was the final blow, setting the
stage for the eventual death of the Polish Second Republic

58

CHAPTER III
“Our” Soviet “Allies”
The Polish-Soviet Alliance: 1941-1943

On 14 November 1939, General Sikorski and British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax met
to discuss Soviet policy in Poland. In this meeting they deliberated over what they thought were
the Soviets’ long term aims: Sikorski submitted that it was the Stalinization of Europe, or at least
its eastern portions. What was unknown was how the Germans would fit into the equation.
Would they be partners or opponents to the Soviet scheme? Lord Halifax thought the latter was
1

more likely. On 19 June 1940, with the expulsion of the British Expeditionary Force from the
continent and fall of France to the Wehrmacht imminent, Sikorski met with the British Prime
Minister Winston Churchill to discuss Soviet aims in light of the German victory in the West.
Sikorski told Churchill that while not advocating for the Allies to provoke the USSR, he warned
against holding any illusions in regards to Stalin’s policy towards the West. Churchill, expressed
interest in friendly relations toward the Soviets stating, prophetically, that after the United
Kingdom defended herself successfully, Hitler might be tempted to strike Russia in the next
spring, thus bringing into the Allied fold a powerful ally against the Germans.

2

Churchill’s assumption came to pass on 22 June 1941. With the German invasion of the
USSR, the Western Allies, now consisting of the United Kingdom, its empire, and the various
governments-in-exile, saw a prospective new ally to aid them in their struggle against their
common enemy. To the British Hitler’s invasion of the USSR was a godsend. Having borne the
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brunt of the war since the capitulation of France in June 1940 they were eager to integrate the
Soviet Union into the Allied war effort. Even before the initiation of Operation Barbarossa, the
German invasion of the USSR, the British foreign office had begun to reestablish its links to the
Soviets, severed after their invasion of Poland, based on Churchill’s belief that a German attack
3

on the USSR was inevitable. As German troops massed on the Soviet border, Churchill insisted
that when the hammer fell Britain be ready to aid the Soviets in any way possible. When the
invasion began, the British pounced.
The London Poles were also willing to reestablish diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union despite the role the Soviets had played in the destruction of their country. On 23 June
1941, Sikorski addressed the Polish nation on the German-Soviet War. He spoke of the great risk
that the German nation was taking by invading the USSR; not only did the Germans lose a
powerful ally and access to unlimited resources, but by invading they also betrayed their fear of
the strength of the Soviet Union and its ability to influence events in Europe. More importantly
for Poland, the German invasion represented the end of years of collaboration between the two
nations over Poland’s future. Since the first partition of Poland in 1772, Germany and Russia had
always seen eye to eye on one issue: the elimination of Poland. With this new conflict, Sikorski
claimed that this old partnership had ended once and for all. In addition, the German betrayal
meant that the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939 had been rendered void, meaning, he hoped, a
return to the pre-war borders of the Treaty of Riga, promised numerous times by the British
government, after the Allies secured victory. In this spirit, Sikorski called for the Soviets to
release the Polish prisoners that they had taken in 1939, so they could aid in the common
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struggle against the Germans. Stalin, for his part, desperately sought troops to confront the
German onslaught. With whole Soviet armies being swallowed up in vast German encirclement
operations, the Soviets began looking for alternate sources of man power. Stalin was so desperate
for men he confided to the American President, Franklin Roosevelt’s, diplomatic advisor Harry
Hopkins, that when the United States entered the war, which he thought would be soon, he
would welcome the deployment of independent American forces on the Eastern Front.

5

With both the Soviets and the Western Allies desperate for each other’s aid, an agreement
between Stalin and the Polish Government-in-Exile was seen as vital. Sikorski and the London
Poles realized this, and the weakness of their position in regards to the Soviets. Throughout the
preliminary talks for the Polish-Soviet alliance, the issues that would arise from the conflicting
interests of the two parties were skimmed over or postponed to a later date. The Poles understood
their lack of power in the negotiations and guessed, correctly as it turned out, that the future of
the Polish sate would depend on their allies’ good will. Understanding the Western Allies were
not willing to antagonize their newfound ally by opposing Stalin’s expansionist ideas, Sikorski
sought to bypass any issues that might appear to the United Kingdom as obstructing the course of
6

negotiations. The Poles were willing to make a deal with Stalin to show their goodwill to the
Allied cause to the United Kingdom.
Despite their desire for goodwill, the London Poles had certain conditions for military
collaboration with the Soviet Union; foremost was the recognition by the Soviets of the Treaty of
Riga and the repudiation of the 23 August 1939, Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. Next, they argued
for the release of all Polish citizens being held in bondage by Soviet authorities. Any formation
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of Polish fighting units in the USSR would be dependent on the sovereignty of any such units,
and their employment in battle would be solely up to discretion of the London Poles.
Furthermore, any military force formed would be under the care and protection of the Soviets
and would be supplied and equipped by them as well.

7

In these discussions, the fractured nature of the government-in-exile reared its ugly head.
Members of the rightist parties, fiercely anti-communist, threatened to resign if the government’s
leftist members made deals with the Soviets without territorial guaranties from Stalin. As the
terms of the treaty between the Poles and the USSR were being negotiated, three ministers of the
cabinet resigned when Sikorski signaled his intent to enter into an alliance with Stalin without
8

such guaranties or the release of all Poles interned in the USSR. Due to a diplomatic
breakthrough, Sikorski was able ensure the release of the Polish prisoners, but without Stalin’s
agreement on Poland’s post-war borders, the damage had already been done; the three resigned
members left the government. This discord would arise throughout the war, leading to a
government that the Allies viewed as obstinate and to be avoided even as Sikorski sought to find
intermediate ground. The inflexibility of the London Poles was part of the reason that the Allies
were content to decide the post-war fate of Poland without the involvement of the governmentin-exile, just as Pilsudski had done with the squabbling Sejm.
Nevertheless the negotiations resulted in the signing of the Sikorski-Mayski Agreement
on 30 July 1941, a Polish-Soviet treaty which annulled the 1939 Soviet-German treaties
regarding Poland. This agreement restored diplomatic relations between the two nations, called
for joint military operations against the Axis powers, and gave amnesty to Polish prisoners being
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held by the USSR. An additional treaty, the Polish-Soviet Military Agreement was signed 14
August 1941. This facilitated the formation of Polish Army in the USSR. The Poles conditions
were primarily met with the signing of this document. The new Polish Army would serve the
London Poles, and its soldiers would take an oath of loyalty to said government. While the force
would exist under Soviet operational command, it would not be employed without Polish
agreement and would be staffed by Polish officers. Additionally, the USSR would outfit the
9

troops to be reimbursed by the Polish government once the war had been won. The army
created by this agreement, it was thought, would be used to help stem the tide of the German
invasion and help, even if only slightly, to lessen the operational burden of the Red Army. Yet
while Stalin would welcome the aid of Western troops in his time of need, his view on the Poles
was more considered. Even at this early date, as the Germans were advancing deep into the
Soviet Union, Stalin was intent on keeping the territory he had gained in the Molotov-Ribbentrop
10

Pact. An independent Polish force fighting its way into Poland alongside the Red Army would
have complicated his vision of post-war Europe. As the Poles would discover in the coming
years, Stalin would never give arms to those not directly under his control to him. In regards to
the shape of post-war Poland, a secret protocol was also included in both documents, stating that
11

any territorial claims or other issues were to be dealt with at a later time. Sikorski’s attempts to
garner goodwill while dealing with the Soviets were, effectively, forced on him by the British.

12

In their rush to ensure Soviet support for the war effort, the British strong-armed the Poles into
accepting an alliance with the USSR while omitting any reference to Poland’s post-war borders.
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The reason for the Poles’ acceptance of this rather vague secret protocol were the repeated
guaranties made by the Western Allies, Britain in particular, that Poland’s prewar borders would
be recognized upon the cessation of hostilities. On 30 July 1941 British Foreign Secretary Eden,
issued a note stating the United Kingdom would recognize no territorial changes that had
affected the Polish state since August of 1939. Furthermore, Eden assured Sikorski that Great
Britain had made no agreements with the USSR which would affect the relationship between the
United Kingdom and Poland.

13

In hindsight Sikorski and the London Poles may have missed their best chance for a
14

favorable post-war outcome in these original negotiations with Stalin. The suffering and strain
that the Germans were visiting upon the USSR was enormous, Stalin’s power was at its weakest,
and his need for aid at its height. Had the Poles forced the issue of territorial integrity, against the
wishes of the United Kingdom and the USSR, and been willing to compromise they may have
been able to secure some measure of survival for the Second Republic in the post-war world.
Stalin may have seen the Poles support in his dark hour as more important that something in the
unforeseen future. At the same time, the Soviets were aware of the British pressure on the Poles
15

to comply with Soviet demands. They could and did bet on Britain’s understanding that AngloSoviet cooperation was more important than the problem of Polish borders. So long as the British
were pushing the Poles to accept Stalin’s terms, he had no need to compromise with the London
Poles, knowing that the British would ensure that he would get his way.
In regards to the war, Sikorski, Churchill, and Stalin agreed that the new Polish Army
would be used to help shore up Soviet defenses against the Germans, and therefore should be
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made operational as quickly as possible. Sikorski and Churchill also agreed that the Polish force
should be assembled and deployed as closely to British supply and military bases as was
possible, showing accurate foresight of problems that would arise between the Soviets and the
Poles over the creation and use of the Polish forces.

16

The entrance of the USSR into the Allied war effort in June 1941 was just as harmful to
Poland’s cause as the Nazi-Soviet invasion. Poland’s sway as the third largest Ally power
resisting the Germans was greatly diminished by the entry of the Red Army. It became obvious
to the Western Allies, and the Poles alike, that the Soviets were far more important to the
struggle for victory that some half a million Polish troops or the national integrity of Poland’s
post-war borders. The hesitance on the part of the Poles and British to press Stalin on the issue of
Polish territory while he was at his weakest proved a dire mistake for future negations. The
London Poles still possessed a measure of strength and had the recognition and the British
promises to back them up, yet, from this point on, there importance would rapidly begin to
dissipate.
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CHAPTER IV
1
“Za naszą i waszą wolność”
The Polish Army-in-Exile: 1940-1945
Perhaps the Polish Government-in-Exile’s greatest strength was the military forces that it
could, and did, contribute to the Allied cause. Despite the loss of their nation, Poland was
determined to fight for its freedom rather than wait for the Allies to give it to them. With this
resolve, the newly formed Polish government went about recreating a Polish Army of as large a
size possible. The creation of this army-in-exile served two of the Polish goals. First, it showed
that even though Poland had been conquered as a result of the German and Soviet occupation, its
government, recognized by the Allies, still represented the Polish people and possessed an armed
force that would actively be resisting the occupying powers. Secondly, the presence of a large
Polish military force, it was hoped, would allow the government-in-exile to gain a place on the
Allied War Council. This would give the Poles an important position within the Allied camp and
a voice in Allied decision-making and war-planning, vital for the Poles to retake their homeland.

2

As the war went on, the Polish Armed Forces became even more important to the governmentin-exile as it represented one of their major continuing contributions to the Allied war effort.
Operational Polish soldiers, sailors, and airmen, it was thought, ensured that Poland would be
fully reborn after the conflict. Though they would begin their time in exile with a large amount
of men at their disposal, for most of the war, Poland would be represented on the ground by only
two formations, the Polish I and II Corps.
The origins of what would come to be known as the Polish I Corps go back to the
September campaign of 1939. After the Soviet invasion of 17 September, the Polish Army still in
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the field followed their final orders and retreated south into Romania and Hungary, with the
intention of escaping Eastern Europe and reforming in France alongside the Polish government
in order to continue to offer resistance to the invaders of their country. This plan was interrupted
due to German threats to Romania and Hungary, resulting in the retreating Polish troops being
disarmed and interned just as their government had been. The cost of keeping so many Polish
prisoners was prohibitively expensive, and the pre-war friendships that existed between the three
nations, meant that many Polish servicemen escaped with the aid of the Romanians and
Hungarians who usually looked other way.

3

Upon joining the government-in-exile’s forces, they formed a large sovereign Polish
Army. Yet, for many reasons, including the fact that many of the French Poles worked in areas
the French saw as crucial to the war effort, only a portion of the forces desired by the Poles were
able to be raised. In all, some 43,000 Poles were formed into four infantry divisions and an
4

armored brigade in France. What resulted was a peculiar army, mixed in its composition in
every way imaginable, just as the Polish Army had been at the founding of the Second Republic.
There were pre-war Polish soldiers to be sure, but mixed in among them were, artists, writers,
priests, university professors, former French Foreign Legionnaires, Polish settlers from Peru,
Polish miners from France, and even the former Polish ambassador to Berlin. The politics of the
army also varied from the right wing Poles that had managed to escape Poland, and left wing
Poles who had been living in France, some to escape Pilsudski’s Sanajca.

3
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Further complicating the problems of forming a competent new army was that many in
the French political and military command blamed the Poles for provoking the Germans and
6

starting the war. Others did not wish to allocate military resources to the Poles due to their swift
7

defeat at the hands of the Germans. Due to the feeling that the Poles were not willing, or simply
8

unable to fight, they were put at the “bottom of the rung” for supplies, billeting, and training. As
well, the French for the most part, ignored Polish intelligence about new German technology and
tactics. Yet the French did take time to study the short Polish War and from it tried to derive the
German’s strategy. The problem was that each person who looked at the September campaign
took a different lesson from it, usually proving arguments they had long made, such as
DeGaulle’s emphases on offensive armor operations, General Georges stressing the use of air
power coordinated with ground forces, or even Chamberlin who saw the fighting in Poland as
proof that the bomber was the key to victory. The common conscious in the French command
was that the Germans actions in Poland were based on the specific strategic situation and
therefore, their action in the West, while maintaining some similarities, would be different. They
were determined to not make the same mistakes as Poland such as defending their entire border
9

or marching out to meet the blitzkrieg. As some French officers snidely put it France was not
Poland. In reality, the French would make their own mistakes.
Despite these problems, the Poles had one unit that was combat-ready by the time Allied
operations in Norway began on 14 April 1940. The Polish Podole Brigade was sent to Narvik to
aid in its recapture from the Germans. While there, it performed admirably, but the entire Allied
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mission proved a failure, and the expeditionary force was pulled out on 8 June, with the Polish
brigade forming the rearguard, to aid in the defense of France.

10

Having played no part in the fighting in the low countries in May 1940, when the German
invasion of France proper began on 5 June 1940, the negative opinion of the Polish Armed
Forces was quickly forgotten and the hastily thrown together Polish divisions were put into the
line of battle at Petén’s personnel request. Despite not having been adequately trained, supplied,
or armed, the rough Polish divisions, having previous experience fighting the Germans, were
determined to prove their worth. On 26 May, the Polish 1st division held Metz against four
German divisions, leading Petain to despair that “If there had only been ten Polish divisions,
11

victory would have been assured.” Throughout the fighting, the experienced and motivated
Poles were often used to cover the retreating French Army, holding bridge heads and even
launching counter offensives to take pressure off of French units. The 10th Armored Cavalry
Brigade, the name given to the reformed “Black Brigade”, the only mechanized and undefeated
Polish unit in September campaign, had been given little training in their time in France and
were issued old French tanks only shortly before they were ordered into battle. Despite this, they
rode out to the front, holding off a German attack on 13 June and providing a rearguard for
retreating French units for five days until, due lack of fuel and ammunition, they were forced to
12

abandon their tanks. With the French armistice, Sikorski ordered the Polish forces to make their
13

way to the sea and then to the United Kingdom. Though the task was difficult, many were
eventually evacuated by Polish and British ships. At the same time many Polish units were
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forced to surrender to the Germans while others decided to retreat into Switzerland where they
14

were interned for the remainder of the war. This tremendous loss of men and the chaos of the
French campaign convinced the Poles that, from then on, Polish units would only fight in
cohesive formations and not be scattered piecemeal across a whole battle front.
The Polish force that had escaped to the United Kingdom was vastly smaller than the four
divisions they had possessed in France. When reformed in Brittan, there proved only enough
manpower to outfit two units. The decision was made that the war effort could be best served by
the formation of an armored division and parachute brigade.
The armored division, labeled the 1st Polish Armored Division was formed primarily
from the survivors of the Polish “Black Brigade” and subsequent 10th Armored Cavalry Brigade,
reinforced by Polish volunteers. The British, having seen the success of Polish units fighting in
France, and needing all the manpower they could muster, were much more free-handed than the
French in their supplying of the division, issuing the Poles modern tanks for the first time and
giving them the task of defending a section of the Scottish coast against the feared German
15

invasion. It was later assigned to be used in the invasion of the continent. Fearful of the heavy
casualties that the first wave would encounter and due to the fact that the division comprised a
large portion of Polish servicemen engaged in the war effort, it was agreed by the Allies that the
division would be employed in the second phase of the invasion, the Normandy breakout. On 1
August 1944, the same day as the uprising in Warsaw began, the Polish division was brought
16

ashore at Normandy. The regiment quickly gained a reputation for aggressiveness, desiring to
kill Germans above all else. Its moment of triumph came on 19-21 August when the division
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held Mount Ormal through three days of continuous fighting in the key battle to close the Falaise
17

pocket, and destroy the encircled Wehrmacht in Normandy. For the rest of the war, the division
faced continued actions against the Germans, helping to push them back through Belgium, the
Netherlands, and into Germany proper. In their push into Germany, they liberated the towns of
Saint-Omer, Ypres, Ghent, and Passchendaele ending the war and capturing and occupying the
Kriegsmarine naval base in Wilhelmshaven.

18

The Polish airborne unit, dubbed the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade, was
created with the intent of dropping an experienced, trained, and well-supplied force into Warsaw
19

after the initiation of an uprising. From the very beginning, however, the shortage of transport
aircraft and the vast distances involved proved a hindrance to such a plan. With the initiation of
the Warsaw uprising on 1 August 1944, the brigade encountered further problems due to the fact
that Stalin would not allow Allied planes supporting the uprising to land at Soviet airports, an
20

absolute necessity for any airborne jump into Warsaw. With the reason for their original
creation denied, political pressure was put on the London Poles to release the brigade into Allied
command, to be used in the upcoming operation Market Garden. Due to the Soviet intervention,
the lack of available aircraft, and in order to prove the Poles commitment to the Allied cause, the
brigade was released to British service.

21

In Operation Market Garden, the Polish brigade was put into battle far too late after it
was clear to the Allied command that the operation had failed. In what serves as a microcosm for
Poland’s struggle during the Second World War, the use of the Polish Parachute Brigade in
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Market Garden did nothing but squander a large number of trained Polish fighting men at the
expense of the resistance in Poland itself. Despite the hopelessness of their cause and the Allies
having dropped the brigade onto enemy-occupied landing zones, resulting in extreme casualties,
the brigade fought valiantly, making a river crossing under enemy fire and providing cover to
22

allow the British airborne to escape the German encirclement. To add further insult, for many
years the Poles were blamed for the debacle by one of the operations planners, Fredric
Browning, despite the fact that it was poor planning in the first place that led to the useless
slaughter. It was not until many years later when personnel accounts of the battle and a
comprehensive history by Cornelius Ryan were published that the Poles were absolved of the
false accusations.

23

The beginnings of what would come to be the Polish II Corps also lay in the September
Campaign, but rather than being comprised primarily of those soldiers that had escaped
southwards, it would be composed of Polish POWs taken by the USSR in their westward
invasion of Poland. After the Soviet invasion on 17 September 1939 more than 1.5 million Polish
citizens, including over 240,000 Polish POWs, had been deported from Soviet-occupied Poland
by the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, the NKVD, to the Gulags of the eastern
24

USSR. The Sikorski-Mayski Agreement stated that the Polish Army in the USSR was to be
comprised of these released prisoners. Yet by October 1941, over two months had elapsed since
the signing of the agreement, and progress was painfully slow. Vast numbers of Polish citizens
were still being held in Soviet labor camps. When this was brought up by the London Poles, the
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Soviets gave numbers and statistics which claimed that most of the Poles had been released. The
Polish ambassadors pointed out that the numbers were wildly inaccurate based on other
documents given to the government-in-exile by the Soviets themselves. The Soviets promised to
look in to the matter, yet the point would come up again and again throughout the formation of
the army.

25

Granted amnesty by Stalin, the POWs and volunteers from the civilian prisoners who had
been released would be trained, equipped, and supplied by the USSR. As stated in the military
treaty, the army would be subordinated to the command and authority of the Polish Government26

in-Exile. This was an early and rare recognition by Stalin as to the legitimacy of the London
Poles, most likely due to the Soviets need for all the assistance they could get. Operation
Barbarossa was still advancing deep into the USSR causing millions of casualties, capturing even
greater numbers of POWs, and showed no signs of stopping. Even with the size of the Red
Army, and the harsh penalties imposed by Stalin on those who retreated in the face of the
Wehrmacht Stalin realized that it would still take a massive effort to drive the Germans back, if
the Poles could aid in the endeavor then he was willing to use them, at first. The London Poles
under Sikorski appointed General Władysław Anders, just released from the NKVD’s Lubyanka
prison in Moscow, as the commander of the new Polish II Corps that would eventually come to
be called Anders Army. As Anders made his way south, on 17 August General Michał
Tokarzewski began forming the Polish Army-in-Exile in Totskoye, near the Kazakhstan border,
27

in the remains of a camp where the Soviets had kept Polish prisoners of war. In the months that
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followed, Polish prisoners, freed by Stalin’s amnesty, began to coalesce in the area from the
eastern USSR.
By the spring of 1942, over 75,000 soldiers had been recruited into the Polish II Corps
and been formed into four infantry divisions. General Anders was given specific guidance by
Sikorski on how these troops should be employed. Most importantly, the Polish troops must not
be used as Soviet cannon fodder. They should not be split up and spread out over the front, as
they had been in the Battle of France, but rather fight as a cohesive Polish Army. The troops,
Sikorski stated, were far too important to the future of Poland to be wasted; they would be
needed after the war to assure that communism was not transplanted by the Soviets onto Polish
soil. Additionally, Anders was to make sure that the army would not be used in battle until they
were combat ready. Sikorski also suggested that the Poles be used in the Caucuses, as this was
fast becoming a decisive front and was also near British lines of supply, which would aid in their
success.

28

During the formation of the II Corps, questions began to arise that would have disastrous
consequences in the coming year. While the II Corps had a great deal of manpower, there was a
distinct lack of officers. A significant number of Polish officers listed by the Soviets as POWs
were missing from the II Corps rolls; they had never arrived at the marshaling areas. When the
London Poles received this vexing news, they petitioned the Soviet government seeking
information about the missing officers while citing their importance to the Poles’ and Soviets’
joint war effort. The problem was first brought up on 7 October 1941, when the Polish
ambassador inquired as to the location of some 7,500 Polish officers. The ambassador pointed
out that the officers had failed to be located despite strenuous efforts by the Polish government.
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Soviet authorities responded that the London Poles had misplaced the officers. The requests for
30

information about the missing officers continued throughout 1941 and into 1942. The Polish
government became more concerned as time went by because, all together, these missing officers
made up almost half of the pre-war Polish Armies’ officer corps, and they were direly needed by
the new Polish Army forming both in the USSR and in the United Kingdom. The government-inexile’s questions concerning the officers’ locations were overlooked, ignored, or written-off by
Soviet authorities. Stronger and continued inquiries by the London Poles into the location of the
missing men were eventually answered personally by Stalin. In their meeting, Stalin assured
Sikorski that all the Polish prisoners, including the missing officers, had been freed, but they
could not all be accounted for due to having lost track of them in Manchuria after the German
invasion.

31

At the same time the Soviet authorities were making it increasingly difficult for the
Polish forces to reach combat readiness. First, there was an ongoing dispute with the Soviets
over whether non-ethnic Poles, Jews, Belarusians, and Ukrainian who were citizens of the
Second Polish Republic were eligible for recruitment into the II corps. As the Second Republic
was a multi-ethnic nation, the government-in-exile assumed that all citizens would be allowed to
be recruited into the army. As this was the agreed-upon policy in the 30 July 1941 SikorskiMayski Agreement, the Polish embassy in Moscow delivered a note to the Soviets on 10
32

November 1941, requesting that it be carried out in accordance with the agreement. The Soviets
considered the Belarusians and Ukrainians to be Soviet citizens and would not allow them to join
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the Polish force, and indeed drafted many of them into Soviet units. The Soviets responded to
the Polish embassy’s note stating that as the remaining citizens of eastern Poland, referred to by
the Soviets as the western districts of Ukraine and Belorussia, had been granted Soviet
citizenship by a decree from the Supreme Council of the USSR on 29 November 1939, they were
no longer Polish citizens and were eligible to be drafted into the Red Army. This Soviet decree
forced the peoples in the eastern part of Poland, without their consent, to lose their Polish
33

citizenship. Second, the Soviets were assigning low priorities to the logistics of the Polish II
Corps. With the Red Army’s need for material and Stalin’s distrust of the Poles, the II Corps was
at the tail end of the USSR’s supply chain. This lack of support made it difficult for the Poles to
train and impeded their ability to enter into combat operations. In response to these concerns, the
Soviets suggested that the Poles get their equipment from the Western powers that were better
34

able to supply them. Things became worse in 1942, when the Soviets cut the rations allotted to
the II Corps, stating that they should go to Soviet units fighting at the front. In all, Anders Army
had its rations cut to half its official size, which did not take into account the large numbers of
35

Polish civilians that had become dependent on the army’s rations. As a result, starvation began
to affect members of the Polish camps, with upwards of 100 people dying every day.

36

Throughout 1942, mostly due to the Soviets’ lack of supplies, the II Corps was unable to reach
operational readiness.
With this lack of action and delays in forming a functioning combat unit, many of the
more committed Poles requested to be transferred to Polish units in the West which were already
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engaged in fighting German forces. The Soviets, insisting the bulk of the Polish Army should be
37

kept for use in the Soviet Union, refused to allow these volunteers to leave USSR and join the
existing and currently fighting Polish Armed Forces in the West. This can be seen as Soviet
reluctance to lose their de-facto control over the II Corps by allowing the best and brightest to
slip away to the West. Another problem emerged upon the discovery that not all of the Poles in
the Soviet labor system had been released, despite Stalin’s blanket amnesty of all Poles in the
Soviet Union. It came to light that some administrators of Soviet Gulags were not willing to
release their Polish prisoners as they required the slave labor to meet Soviet production quotas.
Molotov stated on 15 November 1941, to the Polish ambassador who raised the question of the
Poles still in Soviet labor camps that as the Polish Corps forming in the USSR was not yet active
against the Germans, the needs of USSR meant that Poles in the Soviet Union must work where
and when they were needed to aid the war effort.

38

With the growing agitation and dissatisfaction of the Polish II Corps, as well as the
changing fortunes of the Eastern Front, Stalin began to view the Polish troops as non-vital and a
drain on the Soviet war effort. As early as fall of 1941, Sikorski foresaw the problems with
creating a Polish Army in the USSR and began planning to move most of, if not all of the force,
to the British controlled Middle East. Fear of Soviet treachery combined with the material
39

support of the Western Allies made the transfer all the more appealing. On the Soviet side, the
London Poles, and therefore Anders Army, began to be viewed by Stalin as a threat to his postwar vision for Poland. Ander’s Army represented a strong military presence loyal to the
government-in-exile, in the liberated Polish state. This would serve as an impediment to Soviet
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attempts to control Poland after the war. Better, Stalin decided, to allow the II Corps to be
transferred to the West, thus keeping them far away from their Polish homeland. In accordance
with this line of thinking, on 18 March 1942, with the Soviet authorities unable to provide
adequate rations for the Polish Army, which was sharing its limited food supply with a growing
number of Polish civilians, flocking to the Polish military for aid after being released from Soviet
prisons and camps, Stalin made his decision. He agreed to move a portion of the Polish
formation as a military force to Iran along with over 41,000 civilians.

40

In July, under pressure from the Western Allies, Stalin agreed to allow the remainder of
the Poles to be moved to Iran, effectively transferring control of the II Corps from the Soviets to
41

the British. Throughout March and April of 1942, the Polish forces were transferred by the
Soviets across the Caspian Sea to the port of Pahlavi in Iran. For most of the Polish soldiers and
civilians, their hardships were not over. The Soviets and the British, either lacking or
withholding the transportation needed to get the Poles to their marshaling grounds in the Middle
East, left the Poles to their own devices to get to their destination and most were forced to walk
or hitchhike through Central Asia.

42

As the transfer of the soldiers began, the core of what would become the II Polish Corps
had already been fighting the Germans for some time in North Africa. Made up from Poles who
had made their way to French-controlled Syria after the fall of Poland and subsequently British
controlled Egypt after the fall of France, the newly reformed 1st Polish Independent Carpathian
43

Brigade was at first earmarked for operations in Greece and the Balkans. This was changed due
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to the sudden appearance of Erwin Rommel and his Afrika Korps in the North African desert. In
late August 1941, the unit was shipped to the besieged port city of Tobruk, where for the next
few months they held one of the fortresses most vulnerable sectors against repeated German and
44

Italian attacks. Having emerged victorious at Tobruk the brigade was withdrawn back to the
Middle East to provide a battle hardened cadre for the recently arrived Anders’ Army.

45

By 1944, the Polish government was under tremendous pressure to put the II Corps into
battle. Having refused Stalin’s request to send a division to the Eastern Front, Stalin accused the
Poles of being unwilling to fight, despite their exemplary service on many other fronts.

46

Additionally with the eastern portions of Poland being offered up to the Soviets, it was
imperative that the II Corps be put into action, to further show the contributions that Poland was
making to the defeat of Germany. Their chance came with the Allied invasion of Italy. Initially,
the Poles had been in favor of Churchill’s proposed strategy of a landing in the Balkans, the true
so-called, soft underbelly of Europe, as this would have been the closest direct route to their
homeland, with the chance to perhaps even beat the Red Army to the Polish frontier. When the
decision was made that Italy, not the Balkans, would be the Allies’ target, the Poles reluctantly
47

put the II Corps at the Allies disposal. The moment of triumph that the II Corps had been
waiting for came in May of 1944, at the Battle of Monte Casino. Monte Casino, a massif upon
which a 7th century Benedictine monastery was built, was the center point of the German
defenses in Italy, the so called “Gustave line.” Throughout April, 1944, the Allies had made
three separate attempts to take the position but American, British, New Zealand, and Indian
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forces had been bloodily repulsed. In May, Anders’ Army was given the option of leading the
next attack, while at the same time, being told they had the right to refuse due to the enormous
49

casualties he was expected to take in an assault on the monastery. Anders however saw this as a
golden political opportunity with immense propaganda value. If the Poles could take the
monastery where no other nation’s troops had been able, they would bring Poland’s cause currently so hard pressed - to the forefront of world opinion.
After a first failed attempt, on 17 May, the Poles again attacked the massif. Through a
tremendous hail of artillery, grenades, and small arms fire, the Poles finally managed, after a day
of fighting, to clear the monastery of its defenders, the elite 1st and 3rd Fallschirmjäger
50

51

regiments. In doing so, they had taken over 4000 casualties, including 1000 dead. Though
they had achieved a major victory, their losses had been too heavy, and they were taken off the
line for rest and resupply. With the June 1944 Normandy invasion, the Italian campaign became
a secondary theater of operations, and many divisions were taken from Italy and sent to France.
The II Polish Corps remained engaged in heavy fighting throughout the rest of 1944 into 1945,
leading the Allied drive up the Italian peninsula. Anders’ Army ended their war on 2 May 1945
in Northern Italy. Yet, the Poles received little credit for their exploits in Italy after Monte
Casino; by this time they had become a political liability for their rabid hate of the Soviets and
their system, of which many members of the II Corps had firsthand experience. By the later parts
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of the war, it was noted by observers that they were visibly more concerned with Soviet troop
movements in Poland than in those of their German opponents.

52

Of all Poland’s military forces active during the war their Air Force has received the
most, yet still limited, publicity. After escaping Poland and making their way to France, the
majority of the Polish pilots continued on to the United Kingdom, as the Royal Air Force was
53

seen to be preferable to the dated French Air Force. Despite their admirable performance in the
defense of Poland and their desire to continue the fight against the Germans with the Western air
forces, German propaganda had painted the Polish pilots as backwards and amateurs. The British
further hindered the integration of Polish pilots into the RAF by forcing them to confirm to
54

Commonwealth guidelines, including an oath of allegiance to the King of England. When the
Battle of France began, those Poles who had managed to join foreign squadrons were immensely
frustrated by the Western Allies’ use of air power. The Poles saw the tactics and operations of
the West to be inferior to the Germans, but their observations were not taken seriously by the
Allied air command. The rapid retreat of the Allied armies and the generally chaotic course of
the campaign also hampered the usefulness of the air support. Nevertheless, some 133 Poles flew
in the battle shooting down over 50 German planes with a loss of only nine pilots.

55

As the Battle of France ended, the Polish airmen made their way across the channel to the
United Kingdom. Desperate for men, the RAF now dropped its hindering requirements for Poles
to serve and began grouping the Poles into their own squadrons. Once again, the British initially
viewed the Poles as ill trained, despite the fact they had more combat experience than any other

52

Kochanski, The Eagle Unbowed, 480.
Kochanski, The Eagle Unbowed, 210.
54
Lynne Olson, Stanley Cloud, A Question of Honor: The Kościuszko. Squadron: The Forgotten Heroes of World
War II (New York: Arrow, 2004), 98-100.
55
Kochanski, The Eagle Unbowed , 216.
53

81
Allied pilots. Yet after the language barrier was broken and the Poles adapted to the constraints
of the RAFs flight system, four Polish squadrons, 300, 301, 302, and 303, were made
56

operational. During the Battle of Britain these Polish squadrons were placed in one of the most
dangerous areas in the whole of fighter command, flying in the most active period of the German
air assault during the Battle of Britain. By the time the German onslaught died, the Polish 303rd
squadron had become the highest scoring squadron of all the Allied forces with 126 victories,
three times the RAF average, at a loss of 33 of their own pilots. For the remainder of the war, the
Polish Air Force, due to its limited size, was kept under British command and participated in
bombing missions over Germany, close air support, convoy security, transportation, and fighter
cover for various amphibious landings in Europe.

57

The Polish Navy largely escaped destruction at the hands of the Germans in 1939 due to
the foresight of Operation Peking. Peking was the Polish government’s reaction to the naval and
air superiority possessed by the Germans in the Baltic Sea. It was realized that if the Polish Navy
remained in the Baltic, it would be destroyed. The best course of action was, therefore, to send
the Polish Navy out into the Atlantic and to the ports of their ally Britain. As war clouds began to
gather in August 1939, the operation was put into effect, with the fleet reaching the United
Kingdom on 1 September the same day the German Wehrmacht crossed the Polish frontier.

58

The Polish Navy operated in a much more limited way than the other arms of Poland’s
military. Consisting of only 27 ships, including 2 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 5 submarines and 11
torpedo boats, some of which were given by the British who possessed spare ships they lacked
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the manpower to crew them, it was unable to operate as a purely Polish force and instead joined
with the British in their varied naval operations. Additionally, the Poles brought 14,000 tons of
merchant shipping, in the form of the Polish Merchant Navy, to the Allied cause. The Polish
Navy took part in the invasion of Norway, in which the destroyer Grom was sunk by German
aircraft and where the submarine Orzel sank the German cruise liner turned troop transport Rio
60

de Jenero. The high point of the Polish Navy during the war was when the destroyer Piorun
was the Allied ship that located the German battleship Bismarck after Allied aircraft had lost
sight of it on 25 May 1941. The small destroyer then began shelling the super battleship, all the
while transmitting messages and hauling signal flags to let the Bismarck know that it was a
Polish ship that was firing on them until the arrival of Royal Navy forces when, out of
ammunition and fuel from is “dual” with the German battleship, it was forced to return to port.

61

Both the Polish Navy and Merchant Marine served throughout the Battle of the Atlantic, making
up parts of convoys across from the United States to the United Kingdom through the Arctic
62

Circle to the USSR, losing seventeen ships in the process. They also joined with the Allied
fleets to provide cover for numerous amphibious landings including Norway, Dieppe, North
Africa, Sicily, Italy, and Normandy.

63

An additional and often overlooked contribution of the Polish government is that, while
fighting for their political and military survival, they allocated vast resources to bring to light the
true horrors of the German occupation of Europe. Indeed, the Polish Government-in-Exile, due
to its extensive intelligence network on the continent and its ability to communicate with the
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Home Army inside occupied Poland, was the first to reveal what would become known as the
Holocaust to the outside world. In a note delivered to the governments of the United Nations on
10 December 1942, Polish ambassador to England Count Raczynski described in great detail the
German extermination of European Jews. He described unequivocally in the document that:
“new methods of mass slaughter applied during the last few months confirm the fact that the
German authorities aim with systematic deliberation at the total extermination of the Jewish
64

population.” Due to the bravery of men like Jan Karski and Witold Pilecki who had infiltrated a
65

66

Nazi sorting facility and volunteered to be interned in Auschwitz respectively, the Polish
Government-in-Exile provided proof of the German atrocities and a timeline of the adoption and
implementation of the final solution.
On 18 January 1943, the government-in-exile was the first to demand that the Allies
attempt to halt the German extermination of Europe’s Jews. They demanded to the Allied
council that the Allies should begin reprisal bombings into Germany, press Berlin to let the Jews
leave German controlled countries, and demand that neutral nations take in the Jews. The Poles
came close to demanding reprisals against German POWs and German nationals in Allied
nations, but halted as this would have been a violation of international law. The British Foreign
Minister Eden rejected the Polish proposal, only offering vague promises to intervene in neutral
countries.
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What the London Poles thought was their greatest claim to legitimacy was the fact that
the overwhelming majority of the resistance inside occupied Poland recognized them as the
68

legitimate Polish government. The state of the resistance in Poland differed from anywhere else
in Europe. Though their country was occupied, the Germans had not declared war on Poland, and
69

the Poles had never formally surrendered. Therefore, no collaboration government emerged in
Poland; rather, the Germans ruled it as a colonial possession. Instead, a new underground society
was formed by the Poles as the ultimate form of resistance. It set up primary schools,
universities, theaters, symphonies, newspapers, courts, and radio - all things banned by the
70

Germans - in an attempt to keep Polish culture alive. The underground’s military arm, the
Armia Krajowa (Home Army), was one of the largest underground movements of the Second
World War, one that saw the government-in-exile as legitimate and took its orders from
London.

71

During the early stages of the war, after the German invasion of the USSR brought all of
Poland under their control, the Home Army began a campaign of sabotage against German
railways in Poland, damaging almost 200 trains in 1943 alone. The resistance’s skill at such
operations resulted in a plan to synchronize the disruption of all railway lines going through
Poland to the eastern front, over which 85% of German manpower was carried east. The plan
was approved by Sikorski, but when he presented the idea to Stalin, the Soviet leader did not
even bother to respond. Another method of sabotage was the resistance cells set up inside of
factories producing war materials for the German military. These cells sabotaged what they
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could, but more importantly, they managed to divert what materials and arms they could to the
Home Army’s supply stores.

72

The underground also initiated a policy of setting up resistance cells inside of the German
concentration camps located in Poland, providing links to the outside world. They primarily
engaged in sneaking food and medicine into the camps, but also targeted the most sadistic Kapos
(prisoner supervisors), SS guards, and informants using methods such as typhus infected lice and
planting evidence to get the offending Kapo or informant killed.

73

For the most part, the Home Army initially stayed away from attacking the German
forces directly, fearing reprisals on Polish civilians, such as those that occurred when the less
74

“sentimental” Soviet-backed Partisans attacked the Germans head on. In 1943, as the German
terror campaign against the Polish people was increased, the Home Army responded in kind,
becoming more aggressive and launching a campaign of targeted assassinations. The
assassinations focused on Poles collaborating with the Germans, like the Polish actor turned Nazi
propagandist Igo Sym, Poles who exposed Jews to the German occupiers, and Gestapo officials
75

such as Franz Kutschera, the Gestapo chief in Warsaw. Attempts were even made on Hans
Frank the Governor-General of occupied Poland's “Generalgouvernement” territory.
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Most importantly, the Home Army trained and marshaled their forces for the great
uprising to come, where they would attempt to free their nation themselves, before the Soviets
arrived to enforce their own brand of “liberation”. Polish officers and NCOs from the pre-war
Polish Army, supplemented by Poles trained by the British Special Operations Executive and
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77

airdropped into occupied Poland, formed the resistance into military units and educated them in
the methods of war.
Though their two Polish Corps were contributing greatly to the war effort, the Three
Great Powers were, in effect, determining Poland’s future unilaterally, without the voice of the
government-in-exile that considered itself Poland’s legitimate government. Yet the London Poles
still had their control of the Armia Krajowa, the Polish Home Army. To demonstrate the power
of the organization and the control that the London Poles still had over their nation, they
developed a strategy where by the Home Army would stage an uprising to wrest control of
Warsaw from the Germans as the Red Army approached.

78

By accomplishing this, the Soviets

would enter a city already liberated from within and under the control of the government-inexile. This would legitimate both the London Poles’ and the sovereignty of the Polish state.
The Uprising, part of a series of actions against the German occupation in the latter half
79

of 1944 codenamed Akcja Burza, Operation Tempest, began on 1 August 1944, triggered by the
sight of the Red Army on the eastern banks of the Vistula and urgings to rebel broadcasted by
80

Moscow radio. The Home Army, under their commander Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski, had
amassed around 40,000 combatants for the uprising in Warsaw, armed with a mix of captured,
81

airdropped, and homemade weapons. In the first four days of the Uprising, the Poles managed
to capture much of the city center, including the historic Old Town, but found stiff resistance in
82

the outlying areas of the city. The areas they did hold were large enough to receive Allied
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airdrops, including they hoped, the Polish airborne brigade, and the Poles settled in to hold their
position until the Red Army entered the city.

Map 3. “Warsaw Uprising Day 5 August 1944” Armia Krajowa w Dokumentach, Vol. IV.,
http://www.polishresistance-ak.org/images/Warsaw_5.08.1944.jpg (accessed April 1, 2013)

Soon after the uprising began, Soviet forces halted their advance 10km outside of
Warsaw; The Red Army did not attempt further operations until January of 1945. Furthermore,
84

they refused to supply the Home Army or support them with aircraft or artillery. On 4 August
1944, Churchill sent a dispatch to Stalin stating that the Royal Air Force planned to airdrop sixty
tons of supplies to the beleaguered fighters in Warsaw. He also conveyed the appeal of the Polish
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Government-in-Exile to engage in operations to relive the Home Army. Stalin responded the
following day by saying that the information Churchill had received on the Warsaw Uprising
was incorrect. Instead of the city being transformed into a warzone, he stated that the Home
Army was merely a few detachments of fighters masquerading themselves as whole divisions.
The bands, said Stalin, had no guns, aircraft, or tanks with which to fight and therefore he could
not imagine that they could have recaptured the city of Warsaw from four German armored
divisions.

86

On 9 August in a conversation between the new Prime Minister of the government-inexile Mikolajczyk and Stalin, the former pleaded desperately with Stalin to send aid to the Home
Army and to reinitiate Red Army operations against the Germans across the Vistula.
Mikolajczyk stated that since the start of the uprising, the Home Army had been holding bridge
corridors across the Vistula River in preparation for linking up with the Red Army, but these
corridors were in serious danger of being overrun. Stalin responded by stating that the Poles had
begun their operations in Warsaw prematurely, despite the calls from Moscow for the national
87

uprising, and that the Red Army was in no position to cross the Vistula. Despite Mikolajczyk’s
further pleas for support, Stalin stonewalled his requests and instead changed the discussion to
88

the Committee of National Liberation. In denying western aircrew’s access to land at airfields
in Soviet territory after supplying the uprisings, Stalin essentially ended the chance of Western
aid to the Warsaw resistance. Stalin’s encouragement for the uprising to commence quickly
turned into the condemnation of the Armia Krajowa as criminals. On 16 August 1944 Stalin
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made his true intentions known in a telegram to Mikolajczyk. He wrote that after closer study the
Soviet High Command determined that since the Warsaw “adventure” was launched without the
Soviet’s knowledge, there was nothing that the Red Army could do to support the uprising.
Consequently, he claimed that the entire enterprise was a useless move that resulted in the deaths
of the city’s inhabitants. Because of this and the attacks by the Polish press on the Soviets for
their “legitimate” lack of action, the USSR disclaimed any responsibility for the uprising and any
fault for its outcome.

89

On 22 August, Stalin replied negatively to Roosevelt and Churchill’s request for Soviet
aid to the Home Army. He claimed that the Home Army was led by power seeking criminals
who had brought the fury of the Nazi war machine down on the residents of Warsaw. In addition,
the uprising was causing an undo amount of focus by the Wehrmacht to be directed at Warsaw,
resulting in the increase of German activity in the Warsaw area. This made it impossible for the
Red Army to liberate the Polish capital at the present time. Indeed the Soviets, it was claimed,
had to repulse German counter attacks in the area rather than getting the rest and resupply that
90

was necessary to reinitiate offensive operations. By this point the Germans had responded to
the uprising in force. After being reinforced by several SS units including the SS Dirlewanger, a
91

penal unit comprised of criminals, and the elite Hermann Göring Fallschirm-Panzer Division,
the Germans began to encircle and push back the Home Army forces. German tactics relied on
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the use of heavy artillery and close air support to demolish the areas occupied by the resistance.
The Poles, lacking any defense against such methods could only sit and take the bombardment.

93

In the weeks that followed, due to the lack of direct Soviet support, numerous requests
were made by the Western Allies for use of Soviet aerodromes to support the uprising by air; the
Allied planes needed to land and refuel to make the round trip. The Soviets denied access saying
that they had already tried airdrops into Warsaw and those had failed causing the vast majority of
the supplies to fall into German hands. This despite Mikolajczyk’s denial that any airdrops had
94

been made by the Soviets. Though the Allies’ called for the Soviets to relent throughout the rest
of August and September, Stalin still refused the use of Soviet aerodromes until the very end. For
over two months, the London Poles tried desperately to get the Western Allies to lend aid to the
uprising, but their pleas fell on deaf ears; the Allies were not willing to cross Stalin for the Polish
resistance fighters. As Polish troops in the West died helping close the Falaise Gap and jumped
into enemy positions in Arnhem to rescue the British Airborne, the Allies merely launched
complaints to the USSR in their attempt to save the people of Warsaw from German retribution.
After holding out for 63 days, the Armia Krajowa had lost over 18,000 fighters, and another
250,000 civilians were killed, most in acts of German reprisal, with 85 percent of Warsaw
95

leveled systematically. In the last few days the Poles had kept up their resistance merely to gain
better terms for their inevitable surrender. The Germans for their part realized that as long as the
Poles resisted, it made the position of Warsaw as a front line city more untenable for the German
forces. On 2 October 1944 having secured terms that guarantied Geneva Convention rights to the
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Home Army, the resistance capitulated to the Germans, and the fighters shipped off to various
concentration and death camps throughout the Reich.

97

This was the great mortal blow to the

London Poles: Their main political and military asset had been destroyed, they had seemingly
been abandoned by their supposed allies, their capital was in ruins, and their nation was
defenseless against the Soviet “liberators.”
The Warsaw Uprising was the last desperate gamble to turn Poland’s fortunes and save
her from being offered-up to Stalin by her supposed allies. The attempt by the London Poles to
underscore their authority backfired spectacularly due to their underestimation of Stalin. The
man who had ordered the Katyn massacre had no qualms with allowing the Germans to root out
the Home Army, saving the NKVD the trouble. As if by Déjà vu, the London Poles, again
overestimated the willingness of the Western Allies to stand for Poland; they had not done it
against their enemy Hitler; they would not do it against their ally Stalin. The Warsaw Uprising
was the London Poles’ swan song, and the defeat of the Home Army signaled that any power
held by the government-in-exile within Poland was lost.
The various actions and battles in which the Polish Army, Navy, Air Force and Home
Army struggled during the Second World War does much to prove the fact that the Second
Republic was still striving for Allied victory over the Germans long after September 1939. The
importance of the Polish Armed Forces to the war effort belies their size. Though vastly outsized
by the Red Army, the Poles were, nevertheless, present at many of the decisive points in the
European War. In the Battle of Britain, the skill of the Polish pilots helped put the narrow margin
of victory in the Allies favor. At Mount Ormal, the Polish 1st Armored Division plugged the
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Falaise Gap allowing the destruction of much of the Wehrmacht in Normandy. The Polish
Airborne pulled the remnants of the British airborne from destruction at Arnhem. The II Corps
walked through the wilds of Central Asia to take Monte Casino and help break the Gothic Line.
The Polish Home Army provided the Allies with the majority of the intelligence gained about the
German actions on the continent. Yet, while the Polish servicemen were fighting, their sacrifices
were being ignored at the great conferences. Despite the London Poles belief that the Polish
Armed Forces were proof of their legitimacy, no matter what impact the Poles had on the war,
the Red Army’s numbers proved to be the more convincing bargaining chip.
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CHAPTER V
Katyn
1943
During the Soviet Union’s invasion of Poland in September 1939, the Red Army had met
with little resistance from the defending Polish Army. With the Poles engaged with the Germans
in the West, their high command, not realizing what was happening, not understanding whether
the purpose of the Soviet intervention was to aid or hinder the Poles, and not wanting to
1

antagonize the USSR, had not authorized its troops to attack the Soviets. This resulted in
massive capitulations by encircled Polish troops; in all, between 250,000 to 450,000 Poles were
2

captured by the Red Army. Two days after the Soviet invasion, on 19 September 1939, Lavrenti
Beria, head of the NKVD, in an effort to manage the growing number of Polish prisoners, issued
orders to create the Administration for Affairs of Prisoners of War and Internees, the UPV.
Under NKVD control, eight camps were constructed in eastern Belorussia based on the GULAG
model. The UPV would put the POWs to work and begin a political indoctrination campaign, as
well as gather information on POWs about their membership in pre-war political parties, to
3

determine who might be a threat to the USSR after hostilities had ceased. After the secession of
hostilities, the NKVD began to arrest and interrogate Polish officers who had escaped capture
during the September campaign and had not managed to go into hiding. On 3 December 1939,
Beria, on the command of Stalin, ordered the arrest of “all registered regular officers of the
4

former Polish Army.” On 14 December Beria learned that almost 6000 Polish officers had been
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arrested since the 3 December order. Additionally, Beria decided that officers would remain in
5

the labor camps while the rank and file POWs were sent home. These camps also began to be
filled with members of the Polish Intelligentsia, who had been rounded up and arrested by the
NKVD as threats to Soviet control over the country.

6

While at the camps, from October 1939 to February 1940, the Polish prisoners were
subjected to interrogations and near constant political agitation by the NKVD. The orders
handed down from Beria on 8 October 1939 contained explicit directions about how the NKVD
should interact with the prisoners. They stated that the NKVD should begin to create a system of
informants among the POWs in order to root out any counter-revolutionary groups that might
exist. The monitoring of the mood and moral of the officers was also a high priority, to better
gauge the overall mood of the Polish people. Files on the various prisoners were to be made,
7

focusing on past employment, membership in organizations, and political beliefs. The prisoners
expected that they would soon be released and allowed to return home, but in reality, the
interviews were actually a selection process to determine who would survive, and who would
perish. On 5 March 1940, four members of the Soviet Politburo - Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov,
and Mikoyan - issued an order to execute over 25,000 Polish "nationalists and
counterrevolutionaries" kept by the NKVD at camps and prisons in the USSR. The memorandum
to Stalin by Beria stated that the officers and men in the camps were “sworn enemies of the
Soviet Union,” who are continuing their counter-revolutionary practices and espionage. Due to
the threat these men represented they were to be tried, without their knowledge and sentenced to

5

Cienciala et al., Katyn,34.
Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2012), 125.
7
Cienciala et al., Katyn, 16.
6

95
death, to be carried out in secret by the NKVD on the grounds of anti-Soviet agitation and
preparation to “enter actively into battle against Soviet Power” upon release.

8

Why such an order was issued by the Soviet government is a hotly debated issue. The
most compelling argument is that Stalin ordered the execution in an effort to deprive any future
9

Polish state of a large portion of its talent. By murdering the cream of the Polish officer corps,
Stalin sought to permanently cripple the Polish military. Furthermore, by weakening the Polish
people in this way, Stalin could be certain that any revived Polish state, which would assuredly
be unfriendly to the USSR, would not possess the skill or leadership to challenge Soviet control
10

of Eastern Poland which Stalin was determined to keep. Another reason for the mass execution
was the Soviet high commands fear that the Polish officers represented a threat to Soviet control
of Poland, as the officers would undoubtedly form the core of any resistance operations mounted
by the Polish people. Indeed, in Beria’s memorandum, he states that “in all these counterrevolutionary organizations [encountered in former Poland], an active, guiding role is played by
11

former officers of the former Polish Army and former police and gendarmes.” With their
military training and leadership abilities, they could make the German-Soviet occupation very
difficult. Another explanation is that Stalin feared war with the West due to the United Kingdom
and France’s expressions of support for Finland during the Winter War. With many Polish forces
having escaped to the West, the thought of having such a large number of trained officers hostile
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to the Soviets so close to where the battle lines might be drawn, may have influenced Stalin to
order the executions.

12

The execution process was carried out by the NKVD between April and May 1940,
primarily in the Katyn forest outside of Smolensk. The first recorded transport of prisoners to
Katyn took place on 5 April 1940, described in a message to the Deputy Commissar of Internal
Affairs Merkulov. The victims were listed on manifests in a clear and precise method as they
departed on trains to Katyn. Most were listed by name, rank, father, birthday, and Prisoner
13

number. The total number of victims is estimated to be at about 22,000 Polish citizens, with
14

those who died specifically in the Katyn forests numbered approximately 14,500 victims. They
included an admiral, two generals, 24 colonels, 79 lieutenant colonels, 258 majors, 654 captains,
17 naval captains, 3,420 NCOs, 7 chaplains, 3 landowners, a prince, 43 officials, 85 privates,
131 refugees, 20 university professors, 300 physicians; 300 lawyers, engineers, and teachers;
15

more than 100 writers and journalists and about 200 pilots.” The remaining 7.5 thousand were
16

killed and disposed of at several NKVD prisons. When the mass executions were over, the
NKVD had murdered almost half the Polish officer corps. The killings were carried out mainly
with German-made Walther PPK pistols, supplied to the NKVD by Moscow. This was partly to
provide plausible deniability for the Soviets and allow the blame to be placed on the Germans in
case the killings were ever discovered. Yet the primary reason for the use of the Walther PPK
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was far more practical: the Nagant revolvers with which they had initially begun the executions
had far too much recoil for prolonged and repeated use.

17

The actual process of the killings was faceless and methodical. The prisoners would be
driven in a bus to a building in the forest. One by one they would be taken into the building past
running mechanical fans designed to help drown out the gunshots. They would then be forced to
enter a room which had been sound-proofed and stood in front of a sandbag wall were they were
shot in the back of the neck from behind by a man waiting in an alcove. The bodies would then
be carried out the back door to waiting trucks, which would take them to a mass grave deep in
18

the forest. The process was repeated hundreds of times a day for weeks, only ceasing once for
the May Day holiday. The murders were completed on 22 May, and the various prisons and
camps were ordered to send the murdered prisoners’ data cards to Moscow and report on the
19

effectiveness of the Poles pre-death labor in keeping their upkeep expenses at a minimum. With
the executions complete, the Soviets though their problems with the Polish officers were over
and buried.
With German invasion of the USSR in June 1941, the killing site in Katyn was overrun
by the German Army and the mass graves of the Polish officer corps were located behind the
German lines. Additionally, with the signing of the Sikorski-Mayski Agreement on 30 July 1941,
the USSR and Poland had become allies, facilitating the formation of the Polish II Corps. With
this decision came Stalin’s amnesty for Polish POWs and citizens in Soviet hands. As Ander’s
Army assembled, questions about missing officers began to be raised by the Polish government.
17
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While the USSR gave excuses for the missing Poles, the Germans were becoming aware of the
Soviets’ crimes. Sometime in late 1942 and early 1943, a German intelligence officer, Rudolf
von Gersdorff, received reports about mass graves of Polish soldiers in the Smolensk
20

countryside. After an investigation, they discovered the first of the many mass graves in the
Katyn forest.
The Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels saw this discovery as the perfect tool to
drive a wedge between Poland, the Western Allies, and the USSR, as well as to highlight the
Nazi propaganda about the horrors of Bolshevism and the Western Allies subservience to it. It
would also serve as a major moral weapon, which was sorely needed after the German 6th
Army’s surrender at Stalingrad two months before. Goebbels therefore gave instructions to the
German press to make the widest possible use of the propaganda material.

21

On 13 April 1943,

the German government, through Radio Berlin, announced to the world their discovery of the
mass graves containing 12,000 massacred Polish officers. In the broadcast, Goebbels claimed
that German forces had uncovered the mass execution site in occupied Russia, 16 kilometers
west of Smolensk. They described a pit, 28 meters long and 16 meters wide with a mass of 3000
22

bodies’ twelve layers deep. The identification of the bodies was not difficult, as they were all
dressed in Polish military uniforms with their identification documents still on their bodies. All
of the victims had their hands tied behind their backs and a single pistol shot in the back of their
necks. It was reported that they were the remains of the entire Polish officer corps captured by
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the Soviets in 1939. The Germans stated that the officers were murdered by the Soviets in the
spring of 1940.
To validate their claims, the Germans quickly brought in a commission consisting of
twelve forensic experts and staffs from German-occupied Europe and Belgium, Bulgaria,
Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Croatia, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, and the
24

neutral country of Sweden. Unsurprisingly, albeit correctly, the German directed commission
found that the mass executions were carried out by their enemies, the Soviets, in 1940, and
condemned the USSR for its actions.
As expected, the Soviets vehemently denied the accusations. The Soviet government
issued a communiqué attacking the German propaganda on 15 April 1943. It claimed that the
statements issued by the German propaganda department were vicious lies. The Soviets argued
that the Germans were responsible for the heinous crime, having caught the Polish officers
working on road building operations near Smolensk in the June, 1941, invasion. In their response
on 15 April, to the initial German broadcast of 13 April, the Soviet Information Bureau, stated
that "[...]Polish prisoners-of-war who in 1941 were engaged in construction work west of
Smolensk and who [...] fell into the hands of the German-Fascist hangmen [...]." In addition, the
communiqué argued that by blaming the Soviets, the Germans were covering up their own
crimes and attempting to discredit the USSR on the international stage.

25

On 16 April, the London Poles issued a statement describing their search for the missing
Polish officers. When given their locations at the beginning of 1940 by the Soviets and
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comparing it with the lack of officers reporting for service to the Polish II Corps, the
government-in-exile was seriously concerned. Additionally, lists of officers taken prisoner by the
Red Army, compiled by fellow POWs showed conclusively that the vast majority of officers
26

were missing and unaccounted for after the spring of 1940. This evidence flew in the face of the
statements that the Soviets had issued, assuring the London Poles that all prisoners in their
custody had been released. The government-in-exile’s statement ended by saying that the Poles
were accustomed to German lies and that they possessed irrefutable evidence of German mass
murder in occupied Poland (the Holocaust), but the Germans detailed description of the massacre
site, along with how well the their information matched up with the Poles’ own, the government27

in-exile’s concern for the whereabouts of their officers warranted further investigation. The
London Poles then requested an examination of the site by the International Red Cross of
Geneva.
Stalin responded in a letter to Churchill on 21 April 1943, stating the fact that the Poles
were questioning the Soviet’s claims of innocence at a time when the Germans were accusing the
USSR of this crime was “indubitable” evidence of contact and collaboration between the London
Poles and the Nazis. This, Stalin claimed, necessitated the breaking-off of relations between the
Soviet Union and the London Poles.

28

On 25 April, Molotov contacted the Polish government

stating that, due to their recent behavior and attacks on the USSR as well as the “obvious”
collusion between the Poles and the Germans with their simultaneous request for a Red Cross
investigation of the Katyn site, the Soviet Union felt it necessary to sever all diplomatic and
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military relations with the Polish government in London. On the same day, Churchill contacted
Stalin in an effort to forestall the break in relations. He stated that he had met and discussed with
Sikorski his appeal to the International Red Cross. Churchill insisted that Sikorski had made the
appeal to the Red Cross independently and that the Germans had followed suit as a propaganda
tool. Furthermore, he informed Stalin that Sikorski was a committed patriot who had had no
contact with the Germans and additionally was willing to cease his calls for an investigation in
order to keep friendly relations with the USSR. Churchill continued by saying that any break in
the Allied bloc would only serve to assist Hitler and play directly into the overall plan of the
30

propaganda attack. Despite this and other pleas, Stalin would have none of it. The discovery of
Katyn and the London Pole’s inquiries provided a convenient reason for Stalin to break with the
London Poles. The Polish Government-in-Exile had become a thorn in his side, unwilling to bow
to his demands. Their continued resistance was an impediment to his desires for post-war Eastern
Europe. Katyn gave him the excuse he needed to brush them aside.
On 23 May 1943, Molotov contacted the Polish ambassador to Moscow Tadeusz Romer
with the USSR’s decision to break off diplomatic relations with the London Poles. In the note,
Molotov stated that the break was due to the government-in-exiles slanderous and pro-fascist
remarks on Soviet guilt of the Katyn incident. He continued by claiming that the London
government was in collusion with the Germans due to their simultaneous call for an investigation
into the killings. Due to the anti-Soviet hostility expressed by the government-in-exile and their
accord with the Nazis, the Soviet Union could no longer maintain diplomat relations with the
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London Poles. With Molotov’s note Stalin finally had the political cover to begin his campaign
of isolating and sidelining the London Poles in earnest. From this point on Stalin, would cease to
try and win territorial acquisitions from the government-in-exile and would instead begin to push
the Western Allies to recognize a communist Polish government set up by the Soviets as the
legitimate head of the Polish state.
To this end, on 4 May 1943, Stalin, in a letter to Churchill, wrote that due to the antiSoviet actions of the London Poles, as well as its perceived pro-Nazi leanings, he had begun
forming a new Polish government in the USSR. He further stated that he wished in the future to
consolidate the government-in-exile with his new government into the future ruling body of
32

Poland. With the crisis of recognition now hitting its climax, further tragedy befell the London
Poles. On 4 July 1943, on his return trip from inspecting the Polish troops in the Middle East,
Sikorski, along with his daughter and chief of staff, were killed when their airplane crashed
33

shortly after takeoff from Gibraltar Airport. This was perhaps “the” turning point for the
London Poles. With the death of Sikorski, the Poles had lost their most prestigious leader, and no
subsequent Pole would have the influence he had had on the Allied camp. As went Sikorski, so
went Poland’s power amongst the Allies.
The replacement of Sikorski proved a very difficult endeavor. He alone had been able to
control Polish hatred of the Soviets and therefore work personally with Stalin. The split between
the pre-war opposition and the Sanacja had never fully been mended, and the search for a
replacement opened up the same wounds that had existed during the formation of the
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government-in-exile. After Sikorski’s death, the decision was made to separate the positions that
he had held, that of Prime Minister and commander-in-chief. This was an effort to separate the
military from politics and disperse the control of Poland’s Armed Forces away from one
34

individual. Originally, the fiercely anti-Soviet General Sosnkowski was the choice for
commander-in-chief with Anders proposed as a suitable alternative. Anders, with his history of
butting heads with the Soviets, was seen by the Allies as unfit for the position. Sosnkowski was
acceptable, they agreed, if his appointment was mirrored by a more democratic Prime Minister.
For PM, the choice was Mikolajczyk, a member of the pre-war opposition and the leader of
largest political party, the Peasant party. He accepted the offer of PM with the condition that the
Constitution, still that of 1935, be changed to limit the power of the executive.

35

Furthermore, he

set about to decentralize the military power of the commander-in-chief, removing the position
from the political cabinet as well as his command of the Polish Home Army to the defense
minister. The Polish military and underground met the news of Sikorski’s replacement with
anger and apprehension. They did not trust the new government, angry that the power of the
much-loved Sosnkowski was taken away and that the pre-war Constitution was, in effect,
rewritten. Another damaging factor to the new government was that with the breaking of
relations between the London Poles and the USSR, they were entirely dependent on the goodwill
of the Western Allies, Roosevelt and Churchill in particular, to act as intermediaries, this at a
time when the Poles were becoming more and more of a liability to inter-Allied unity in the eyes
of the West.
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As the fortunes of war turned, the Red Army began to push the Germans back. After the
liberation of Smolensk and the Katyn area on October, 1943, the Soviets began a massive coverup operation designed to hide the truth about the killings and ensure that the world “knew” that it
was the Nazis who had killed the Polish officers. To facilitate this, the Soviets initiated the
leadingly named “Special Commission for Determination and Investigation of the Shooting of
Polish Prisoners of War by German-Fascist Invaders in Katyn Forest” under Nikolai Burdenko.
The Burdenko commission unsurprisingly concluded that the Germans had committed the crime
in the fall of 1941. The commission’s report would be cited repeatedly as the “official” Soviet
explanation until the admission of guilt by the Soviet government on 13 April 1990.

36

In the meantime the growing Polish-Soviet crisis brought about by Katyn was beginning
to threaten Western-Soviet relations when the Poles' importance to the Allied war effort started
to diminish due to the entry of the military and industrial goliaths, the Soviet Union and the
United States. The London Poles might have to be sacrificed for the sake of good relations
between the West and the USSR. Even so Churchill, admitted on 15 April 1943, during a
conversation with General Sikorski about the discovery of the mass graves that: "Alas, the
37

German revelations are probably true. The Bolsheviks can be very cruel. Indeed classified
British documents stated that Soviet guilt was a "near certainty", but the alliance with the USSR
was deemed to be more important than any moral issues; thus, the official documents and public
accounts supported the Soviets, up to censoring any contradictory accounts in the government or
38

the press. In the United States, Franklin Roosevelt sent Navy Lieutenant Commander George
Earle to investigate the Katyn murders. Earle’s report concluded that the Soviets, not the
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Germans, were guilty of the crime. Roosevelt rejected the investigation’s conclusion and
publicly declared that he was convinced of Nazi Germany's responsibility, He then ordered that
Earle's report be suppressed, to the point of “banishing” Earle to American Samoa for his
insistence that the report be made public.

39

To add insult to injury, at the post-war Nuremberg Trials of the Major War Criminals
before the International Military Tribunal, the USSR attempted to add the Katyn Massacre to the
list of German war crimes. The inclusion embarrassed the Western judges as guilt for the crimes
was still being contested in the Western media. The Soviets, on 14 February 1946 put it forward
as one of the most heinous of the German crimes but were unable to prove that any of the
40

German defendants had been involved with the killings. The Burdenko commission, which the
Soviets thought would prove their case was disallowed by the tribunal as it was seen as biased in
favor of the USSR. Also, they managed to make sure that any evidence used by the defense that
41

might incriminate the Soviets be disallowed. As such the U.S. and British judges dismissed the
charges. That the Soviets might do something like this was a fear that had been voiced back in
1943. British Undersecretary of State Alexander Cadogan stated “that we may eventually, by
agreement and in collaboration with the Russians, proceed to the trial and perhaps execution of
axis ‘war criminal’ while condoning this atrocity.”

42

Despite the fact that the Allies possessed

numerous and detailed reports and investigations, including the classified British documents and
the American Earle report, the Western Allies sat in judgment alongside the Soviet’s, guilty of
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many war crimes themselves, passing sentences on the Germans. The Allies said nothing; they
were unwilling to anger the Soviets, a phrase that had become all too common for the Allies
when dealing with Polish-Soviet relations throughout the war.
The uncovering of the Katyn massacre proved to be another decisive moment in the
demise of the Second Republic. Not only was it an unimaginable tragedy for the Polish people
and Armed Forces, but the government-in-exile’s response to the discovery provided Stalin with
the excuse he needed to finally sever diplomatic relations with the London Poles. This allowed
Stalin the freedom to make his own bid for control of the Polish nation without having to placate
the obstinate government-in-exile. Sikorski’s death compounded the problem; the Polish leader
who possessed the respect of the Allies proved impossible to replace. Yet, as the break had
already occurred between the Poles and the Soviets, there is not much evidence that even
Sikorski could have helped rescue the situation. Perhaps more disturbing is the evidence that,
from the beginning, the Western Allies, FDR, and Churchill in particular, possessed convincing
evidence that the Soviets were responsible for the heinous crime. Nevertheless, even with this
knowledge, they still sat and negotiated with Stalin at Tehran and Yalta and gave him control
over Poland and Eastern Europe; such was the USSR’s importance to the war effort.
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CHAPTER VI
The Polish Problem
Tehran: 1943

The harsh truth for Poland was that as the Second World War went on the question of its
future government and geography diminished in importance. The Western Allies saw ultimate
victory and the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan to be their single most important
objective. To achieve this victory, they needed the Soviet Union and its vast reserves of
manpower. With this in mind, the West was willing to sacrifice part of, and eventually all of,
Poland to satisfy Stalin’s demands. Though Polish troops would continue fighting and dying,
playing critical parts in many of the wars most important battles, including the Battle of Britain,
Monte Casino, and Operation Market Garden, the London Poles would not be allowed to
participate in any conference that would affect the future of their nation, due to the insistence of
Stalin.
Since the Soviet government’s announcement on 6 January 1943 that they meant to
permanently claim the areas of Poland they had occupied alongside the Germans, the
1

government-in-exile had vigorously protested the Soviets actions as unacceptable. Though when
in contact with the American and British governments they received sympathetic words, neither
nation would take any action against the USSR due to the tremendous burden it was carrying of
the allied war effort. Despite this, the Poles kept up their resistance to the USSR’s territorial and
claims. The London Poles remained convinced that they could not compromise on the shape of
their eastern frontiers. They felt that they did not possess the constitutional right to cede territory
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to the Soviets and that if they were to go ahead and do so they would lose the support of the
Polish Army and people.

2

With the discovery of the Katyn killing ground and the Soviets subsequent breaking off
of relations with the London Poles, Prime Minister Mikolajczyk and British Foreign Minister
Eden met to discuss the possibility of reestablishing relations between the government-in-exile
and the USSR. Eden, contrary to his previous assurances of Poland’s post-war territorial
integrity, pressed Mikolajczyk to give in to Soviet demands and accept concessions in the east in
exchange for German territory. Mikolajczyk responded that while he was anxious to reestablish
relations with the Soviets he was not willing to discuss concessions. He stated that he could not
accede to the Soviets demands because, in his opinion, the Soviets did not just desire a piece of
Polish territory, but control over the entire nation as a stepping stone for their goal of controlling
Eastern Europe. He continued that as soon as Soviet forces entered Polish territory, he expected
Stalin to unveil a communist Polish government to challenge the London Poles for post-war
control of the nation.

3

The London Poles, with their history of dealing with the Soviets before the war
understood the goals of the USSR better that the Western Allies. As such they continued to resist
Soviet demands even as the United States and the United Kingdom began to distance themselves
from their previous statements on the Polish problem. The government-in-exile still thought that
they would have a say in the final decision on post-war Poland, they felt that the Western Allies
would eventually honor their promises and the fact that Polish military forces were currently
engaging the Germans on several fronts would serve as a large bargaining tool in negotiations.
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What the failed to realize is just how unimportant the Polish issue was to the West when
compared with the Soviet contributions to the war effort. FDR especially, had made it clear in
March 1943 that the Three Great Powers alone would decide the fate of Poland, and that they
4

would not bargain with the Poles, but do what was best for the peace of the world. The Poles
would have to yield to Soviet demands.
The first of the three great conferences that would decide Poland’s fate was Tehran. On
the 28 November 1943, Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt met in Tehran to discuss the future
conduct of the war and to begin considering the shape of post-war Europe. This was Stalin’s first
chance to enact his plan for Soviet control of Eastern Europe, including Poland, after the war.
For Stalin and the Soviet Union, the conquest of Poland was among their oldest and consistent
5

goals. Poland, due to its size and geographic location, was the key to establishing communist
control over Eastern Europe. With this in mind, at the great conferences of the Second World
War Stalin was determined to retain the territory that he had gained taken the Poles while allied
Hitler, Stalin’s major aim in negotiations being Western recognition of these frontiers.

6

Stalin’s diplomatic strategy was the traditional Soviet strategy, pressed from his position
of strength. It was based on the Marxist principal of the inevitability of the West’s collapse and
subsequent Soviet victory. This explains Stalin’s predatory instinct, where he managed to take
advantage of every Western complacency and mistake, knowing that the West would allow it to
happen. Realizing that the Western Allies were primarily interested in global peace he was able
7

to use that desire to wring concessions advantageous to the USSR. Therefore while the United
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States and the United Kingdom entered into negotiations on the future of Poland willing to give
in the interest of a stable post war world, Stalin came to the table determined to wring every last
concession possible from the Western Allies and the Poles in particular.
At the conference, the topic of Poland and its post-war destiny was not the primary
concern of the Big Three leaders. The main objective of the United States and Great Britain was
to ensure the full cooperation and assistance of the Soviet Union in the execution of Allied war
8

policies. The West was desperate to bring the Soviet Union’s massive military might to bear on
the Germans in the most effective and coordinated method possible. Stalin agreed at the
necessity, but with his own conditions. First, Roosevelt and Churchill would have to begin
operations to support the communist partisans in Yugoslavia. Secondly, the West would have to
express their support for the manipulation of the border between Poland and the USSR, in
violation of a large number of agreements made with the Polish government. Most important,
were the discussions on the opening of a second European front, and the coordination of the DDay landings with a massive Soviet offensive operation, which would come to be called
9

Operation Bagration. This topic outshined the Polish question. The "Big Three" spent days
arguing about when D-Day should take place, who should be its commander, and when the
operations should begin. Throughout the conference, in what would come to be the norm for
such meetings, Stalin dominated the discussion, using the Red Army’s great victory at the Battle
of Kursk, its military might, and the key positions it held on the Eastern front, to ensure that his
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10

demands were met. Poland was not the only state that Stalin was promised a free hand in at
Tehran, Churchill, and Roosevelt also acquiesced to the Soviet Union forming puppet communist
governments in Czechoslovakia, the Baltic States, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and the Balkans,
once they had been “liberated” by the Red Army. It became readily apparent to Stalin that the
Western leaders were far too concerned about achieving victory in the war to risk upsetting him.
Furthermore the West’s negative attitude towards the Poles, brought on by the government-inexile’s refusal to concede territory to the Soviets, encouraged Stalin to be uncompromising in his
demands, knowing that the West would eventually pressure the poles into yielding in the name of
Allied unity.
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Map 4. "Map of Poland in 1945"
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At the Tehran conference, Stalin and Churchill discussed privately their views on the
Polish question. Churchill pointed out to Stalin that England had gone to war for the sake Polish
national sovereignty and was as committed as ever to a strong and independent Poland. Yet, he
stated, in contrast to previous guaranties to the London Poles, that the British had no particular
attachment to any specific Polish frontier. He then pressed Stalin on his feelings toward a
western Polish frontier on the Oder River, to which Stalin replied that he was in favor, yet he
12

stated that the issue of Polish frontiers would require further thought. The American President
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Franklin D. Roosevelt also spoke with Stalin privately on the issue of borders and on the
principle of self-determination in regards to Poland. This discussion was particularly useful
because it reveals Roosevelt‘s true feelings on the Polish issue, and helps to explain his
reasoning for being so accommodating with Stalin, i.e. that both were primarily concerned with
their own political issues, above all other matters. Roosevelt stated to Stalin that there was an
American presidential election the next year and that six to seven million Poles lived in the
United States. Roosevelt wanted their votes, and, therefore, even though he agreed with Stalin on
issues regarding the post-war Polish borders, he could not participate in any public decision on
13

them until after the election. Roosevelt then explained to Stalin that the American public
demanded the right of the Poles to self-determination after the war, even though he thought that
14

the Polish people would choose to join the USSR. Stalin agreed on “future expressions” of the
“will of the people” within the Soviet system, but stated outright that he would not allow any
form of international control. Stalin also stated that Roosevelt should have some propaganda
work done to convince the American people that the Poles would be better off under Soviet rule
and that they would be able to express their will in accordance with the Soviet constitution.

15

The actual discussion on Poland at Tehran occurred on 1 December. Stalin responded to
requests to resume talks with the London Poles by stating categorically that he could not due to
the fact that they had joined forces with the Nazi propaganda machine to slander the USSR and
that Polish forces were involved in the killing of Soviet partisans in Poland. Stalin also stated
that the least the Soviet Union would accept, in terms of territorial acquisition, was the Curzon
Line, an eastern Polish frontier named after the post-World War One British Foreign Secretary
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Curzon, put forward by the Allied Supreme Council after the First World War but before the
Polish-Soviet war. They did agree to compensate the Polish state for the lost territory with East
Prussia and other eastern German territory. The United Kingdom agreed to this decision and
stated that if the Polish Government-in-Exile were to refuse, that they would be well and truly
16

done with them and would defer to the Soviets at the peace table. This decision stripped Poland
of 48 percent of its pre-war territory, and, in exchange, Poland would be given territory taken
from eastern Germany, the so-called “recovered territories” based on the notion that they had
historically belonged to Poland in the medieval period, before German encroachment to the
17

east. This plan, it was agreed, would be finalized at a later meeting.
In all of these deliberations the London Poles were kept uninvolved and in the dark by
Stalin’s demand. The Polish Government-in-Exile’s response to the “official statements” of the
Tehran conference came on 6 December 1943. In the response, the Polish Foreign Minister stated
that Poland, as the longest struggling Allied nation, saw the cooperation of Teheran as heralding
a speedy and complete end to the war. Moreover, the London Poles restated their belief in the
18

Atlantic Charter to deliver to them a free and independent Poland in the post-war world. Stalin
stated his view on the events of the conference on 15 December. He maintained his position that
the London Poles were agents of Hitler and in league with the Nazis in an effort to defame the
USSR. He stated that it was the policy of the Soviet Union to accept the Curzon line as the
western Soviet border if the USSR was also given the Northern portions of East Prussia. In
addition, as an amendment to the Curzon line, the Soviets would not return the city of Lwow,
despite its majority Polish population, as it lay in an area dominated by Ukrainians. Stalin also
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made public his support for a western Polish frontier on the Oder River. Churchill attempted to
use the proposed Polish absorption of German territory to sell the Poles on the decisions reached
at Yalta. With both Poland and the USSR set to receive German territory at the war’s end,
Churchill argued to the government-in-exile that the two nations would be bound together by
20

their joint duty to guard against a future German reemergence. Churchill presented the option to
the Poles by stating that they were being invited to be a protector of European peace. The Poles
saw it differently, and correctly as it turned out, as being permanently bound to the USSR due to
the threat of German revanchism.
Later, in February 1944 Churchill spoke about the Tehran conference in the House of
Commons. In his speech, he stated that even though the United Kingdom had gone to war to
protect Poland’s independence, Great Britain had never guarantied any specific Polish frontier, a
reversal of Foreign Minister Eden’s statement of 30 July 1941. Furthermore, the British had
never agreed to the Polish expansion after 1919, which had given them much of their eastern
territory; it had instead upheld the Curzon Line. Churchill, mirroring Stalin’s own sentiments,
claimed that Russia, having suffered two invasions from the West in the last fifty years, and after
losing millions of men as a result, had the right to protect themselves by establishing more
defensible western borders. Churchill did agree, like Stalin, to compensate the Poles for the loss
21

of this territory by means of eastern portions of Germany. Though the London Poles were told
what had been discussed, the ultimatum on the post-war borders was never delivered, as
Churchill had promised, and the Poles were never informed that any final decision had been
made. This led to an incident at the Moscow conference in October, 1944, where the new Polish
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Prime Minister, Stanisław Mikołajczyk, began to discuss the London Poles’ problems with the
border issue, only to be told by a shocked Molotov that the issue had been settled at Tehran.

22

His territorial ambitions all but secured, Stalin next turned his attention to insuring that
the Polish nation that remained after the war would be politically controlled by the Soviet state.
Realizing that it would be the Red Army that would “liberate” Eastern Europe, Stalin knew that
he would be able to get a lead on any attempt by the Western Allies to reestablish the pre-war
governments of Eastern Europe by putting into power, in the “liberated areas”, communist
governments, backed by the Red Army that answered to Moscow. On 24 June 1944, Stalin sent a
letter to Roosevelt outlining his views on the restructuring of the Polish government. In it, he
wrote of the importance of reorganizing the Polish government with elements of the London
émigré leaders as well as Polish communists in the USSR and liberated Poland. As evidence of
this need for change, he pointed out those statements by the London Poles on the issue of borders
demonstrated that they had not made any forward movement on the issue of reconciliation with
the Soviets. Thus Stalin, expressed his rational for a change of authority over the Polish state.

23

To this end the Soviets proclaimed on 21 July 1944, the establishment of the Polish
24

Committee of National Liberation, also known as the Lublin Government. This committee,
formed from leftist and communist Poles acceptable to the USSR, was Stalin’s challenge to the
authority of the London Poles. The Lublin Government claimed control over all the areas of
Poland that the Red Army had “liberated”.
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The London Poles responded to the formation of the Committee of National Liberation in
a memorandum to Churchill on 24 July. The government-in-exile stated that the Committee was
a communist government that was formed in areas of Poland which had never been contested by
the Soviet Union. The Committee was established with the full knowledge of the USSR, and the
use of Soviet radio in broadcasting the announcement proved Soviet backing for the Committee.
Furthermore, the Committee was made up almost entirely of communists unknown to the vast
majority of the Polish people. Nevertheless, the communists were organizing themselves as a
government and claiming that the London Poles were an illegal fascist organization which made
25

the Committee the sole legal source of authority in Poland. Despite this claim, the London
Poles continued, the Committee offered no grounds as to why they should be considered
Poland’s legitimate authority at the expense of the government-in-exile. The London Poles went
on to express their worries that the Committee, not recognizing the government in London,
would break up and/or betray the Polish underground, who had been struggling against the
German invaders for five years. All of this was contrary, stated the London Poles, to promises
made by Stalin throughout their negotiations on the future reestablishment of a government in
Poland. It was evident that Stalin was putting into power a government that was answerable to
him, not to the Polish people. The memorandum expressed that the Polish government fully
expected the British to honor their promises to restore the Polish Government-in-Exile at the
26

cessation of hostilities. Churchill sent a dispatch to Stalin on 27 July 1944, referencing the
formation of the Committee of National Liberation. In the dispatch, Churchill pushed for the
creation of a joint government of Poles residing in Great Britain and eastern Poles in the USSR;
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this went against promises made to the London Poles, which stated that the government-in-exile
would always be recognized as the legitimate Polish government. Churchill went on to say that it
would be a pity and indeed a disaster if the West were to support one Polish government while
the USSR supported another.

27

It is clear that the Lublin Government was placed in power by Stalin in an effort to create
a roadblock to the status quo antebellum which could not be undone. The Lublin Poles
represented a government, recognized by the USSR, which the Polish people could “vote” for in
the “free and democratic” elections that the USSR had promised in their adoption of the Atlantic
Charter at the Inter-Allied Council in London on 24 September 1941. To this end, in Stalin’s
response to Churchill’s letter on 28 July, he claimed that as Poland’s neighbor, the Soviet Union
welcomed a Polish government friendly to the USSR. The National Committee, Stalin claimed,
was friendlier towards the Soviet government and represented a good starting point for the
formation of a new democratic government in Poland. The Committee, he continued, would lead
to the unification of those London Poles who support democracy in Poland and would overcome
the resistance of those anti-Soviet Poles who had caused the breakdown in relations between the
two states. In conclusion, Stalin reiterated the importance of the Polish question to the Allied
cause and stated that the Red Army was doing all it could to aid and accelerate the liberation of
28

the Polish nation and assist them in regaining their freedom and prosperity. What Stalin failed
to mention is that were the Red Army went, the Red Army stayed. Once his forces had control
over the Polish territory, he alone would decide what its future government would look like.
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On 22 November, in reaction to talks with FDR, during which he declared that he would
not guarantee any specific Polish borders, specifically in regards to Wilno and Lwow, the
government-in-exile refused to ratify any agreement with the Soviets that did not adhere to the
pre-war borders, as agreed upon in numerous past agreements and declarations with the Western
Allies.

29

With the London Poles refusing to accept Stalin’s deal, President Mikolajczyk saw little

hope for bettering the Polish position and resigned. After another Socialist minister’s attempt
was foiled by members of the right wing National Democrats, socialist politician Tomasz
Arciszewski managed to form a government, and subsequently became the last war-time PM of
30

the Polish Government-in-Exile. This inner turmoil gave the appearance to the outside world
that the London Poles were not interested in any deal with the Soviets, only in squabbling with
themselves and holding up the workings of inner-Allied unity. Arciszewski’s new government
was far more firm in defense of Polish rights than Sikorski’s or Mikolajczyks had been. Having
been backed into a corner, the new Prime minster decided that the Poles could not give anymore.
Arciszewski was determined to defend Poland’s territorial and political sovereignty to the last.
Though this garnered Arciszewski the support of Poles living in the West, as well as the Polish
Army, the Western governments were not pleased, believing that they could not force this new
government compromise with the Soviets. The British were angered and outraged by this turn of
events, with Eden going so far as to recommend pulling their ambassador to the London Poles.
Churchill claimed that the new Polish government was inherently weak and that Mikolajczyk
would be back in powered soon. Until then, he assured Stalin that the British attitude toward the
new government would be correct but very cold. For the USSR Arciszewski‘s government was
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very convenient. Due to its stubbornness, Stalin could more readily blame the Poles for the lack
31

of compromise, and the West would more readily believe him. From this point on, the West, for
all intents and purposes, ignored the new Polish government. The Soviets were now free to make
additional unilateral decisions on Poland.
Stalin took this opportunity to urge the Allies to recognize his Lublin government as
legitimate, sighting the perceived stubbornness and intractability of the London Poles. The
Western powers asked Stalin to delay in any action concerning a transfer of legitimacy until the
32

Big Three had met early the next year at Yalta. There is little doubt that by this time, the Poles
were seen as an inconvenient ally for the West to have. The London Poles’ refusal to negotiate
away half of their nation and the subsequent fall of Mikolajczyk’s government caused many in
the Allied camp to wash their hands of the Polish problem and turn to other matters they saw as
more important, effectively handing the initiative of the settlement of post-war Poland, and
indeed eastern Europe, to Stalin.
The conference at Tehran was the beginning of the end for the Second Republic. By the
time the Big Three met, it was clear to all that the Polish issue had diminished to secondary
status. Victory in the war was to take precedence over all other considerations, and if the West
had to sacrifice to Poland achieve the final victory, then so be it. Yet, perhaps the most
frightening aspect of the conference was the fact that the Western leaders apparently believed
that Stalin would honor all the promises he had made to achieve his goals. The Poles’ warnings
about Stalin and his promises fell on deaf ears.
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Chapter VII
The Shape of Things to Come
Yalta: 1945

By the time the Three Great Powers met once again at the Yalta Conference in February
1945, the Red Army was in control of the territory of the Polish nation, and Stalin’s puppets, the
Lublin Government, in charge of its administration. Indeed, the USSR was already in the process
of re-annexing the eastern sections of Poland that it had first taken in 1939. Yalta once again
saw the Polish question sidelined as issues more important to leaders took precedence. The
conference was a world-shaking event, not just for Poland, but for the entire continent. Yalta has
been described as an American revolt against the European order which had dominated world
1

politics for centuries. It transformed the obvious United Kingdom –Soviet Union post-war
confrontation into the worldwide Cold War we are familiar with today. Churchill was the
spokesman of the old order. What he suggested was the classical European pragmatic solution:
the restoration of France and Poland as powerful nations in order to arrange a balance of power
2

such as that created by the Congress of Vienna in1815. He also sought to limit reparations that
would be paid by Germany at the conclusion of hostilities, as to prevent another treaty of
Versailles, and therefore cease the vicious cycle that had begun with the Franco-Prussian War of
3

1870-71. Yet Churchill was only able to achieve the restoration of France, dooming any idea of
a balance of power, insuring Western Europe would become dependent both economically and
militarily on American support in the new Cold War. With the new power dynamic in place,
Churchill continually sought a showdown with the Soviets in order to create a better post-war
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settlement. To facilitate this, he kept focusing on the unresolved Polish situation; he was ignored
by the US and the USSR, who were determined to avoid a crisis at any cost.

4

Stalin, for his part, did nothing to prevent the change in the order of the world. He was
primarily determined to keep the Polish territory that he had gained in 1939 while allied with
Hitler, and maintain the political control over Eastern Europe given to him by the Red Army’s
5

conquests. Whatever he had to agree to get it was inconsequential; he could change his mind
after the fact. Stalin achieved his goals by a process of out-maneuvering Churchill and his aims
while manipulating FDR on his own objectives. He was able to push the issue of Poland,
knowing that the West was willing to let it go due to the Cambridge Five spy ring, operating in
the British government and giving Stalin an immense intelligence advantage, showing
6

definitively that the Allies were not willing to stand for Poland. Most importantly of all, he had
the Red Army, perhaps the strongest bargaining chip in the world at that time. As long as Stalin
possessed the Red Army, he would get what he desired. It soon became clear to both sides that
whoever controlled a territory would decide its social, economic, and political system.
FDR was the main architect for the shape of the new world, due primarily to his failures
rather than his successes. His decisions must not be viewed in the light of the Cold War he
helped to create but rather in the light of 1930s American isolationism. FDR’s main goal was to
get the USSR to support the formation of the United Nations and to intervene in the war against
7

Japan. FDR saw a Europe divided between the United Kingdom and USSR’s spheres of
influence as a normal development. After all, it seemed at the time that Stalin and Churchill were

4

Harbutt, Yalta 1945, 304.
Plokhy, Yalta The Price of Peace, xxvi.
6
Plokhy, Yalta The Price of Peace, 78-79.
7
Plokhy, Yalta The Price of Peace, 15-17.
5

123
to be the only two European leaders left standing after the war, though in reality Churchill lost
his position at the end of July 1945. In truth, Stalin and Churchill did not care about FDR’s UN;
they cared about future security, and merely agreed to the venture in order to get American
support. Stalin, in particular, used discussions on the UN as a negotiating tool.

8

Stalin also knew that the West was anxious to secure Soviet involvement in the war
against Japan and were willing to pay the price for the Red Army’s participation in the Pacific
9

Theater. After FDR had gotten what he desired from the Soviets, he seems to have lost interest
in the post-war blueprint of Europe. He merely contented himself with garnering promises from
10

Stalin about free elections in Eastern Europe. Having consoled himself with thinking that Stalin
would honor his promises of elections, he informed the American public of his new vision for a
free democratic Europe. Unfortunately, his naivety in believing Stalin satisfied the public and
turned them away from foreign affairs, which allowed the Soviets a free hand in setting up
puppet governments in the east. Due to FDR’s wishful thinking, and the failure of his own plan
for a European balance of power, Churchill began to push for an Anglo-American front against
the Soviets, as the United States was the only nation powerful enough after the war to assume
leadership and defend the Western Bloc of nations. By doing this, it was insured that the US had
a stake in the future of Europe.

11

When the Polish issue was discussed at the conference, Stalin opened by stating that the
question of Poland was one of honor and security for the Soviet state. Poland, he argued, had
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12

been a corridor for the invasion of Russia far too many times. This necessitated a strong and
independent Poland that could defend itself from future aggression. With the Soviets
approaching Berlin, any strong stance against the Soviets was hampered by Roosevelt’s
insistence on seeing Stalin not as the invader of Poland in 1939, but as Uncle Joe, his fraternal
ally. He summarized his rationale for his wartime relations with Stalin in 1943 when confronted
by US ambassador to the USSR William Bullitt, Jr., who stated that Stalin was a “devil like
13

tyrant leading a vile system”. Roosevelt responded to Bullitt Jr., “I just have a hunch that Stalin
is not that kind of a man. ... and I think that if I give him everything I possibly can and ask for
nothing from him in return, noblesse oblige, he won't try to annex anything and will work with
me for a world of democracy and peace”

14

The Western Allies acquiesce to the Soviet premier’s wishes. The Soviets, single
handedly carrying the war on the Easter Front, were more important that the Poles and their half
a million fighting me. It was far easier for the West to force the government-in-exile to
compromise than it was to prevail over Stalin’s desires. At Yalta, the Allies therefore ceded to
Stalin the areas of Poland promised to him in his pact with Hitler, legitimizing the pact between
the two dictators that had begun the worldwide conflict. The process to facilitate this recognition
began on 7 February 1945, when Molotov put forward the following proposals in regard to the
Polish question. First, it was the position of the Soviet Union that the Curzon Line should be the
final frontier for eastern Poland, with a western border on the Oder and Neisse rivers. Secondly,
the Provisional Government of Poland would invite selected democratic, anti-Nazi, (originally
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stated as non-fascist) Western émigrés to join with them in a unity government. This
organization would then be recognized by the UN as the legitimate government of Poland until
the Polish people could be called to the polls for general voting on a permanent government.

15

Stalin claimed that the elections would be held about one month after the Germans defeat. In
reality it would be almost two years.

16

On 11 February, the final decisions on post-war Poland were reached at Yalta, almost
completely in step with the Soviet position. They stated that the Allied powers were still
committed to a free, independent, and democratic Poland. Due to the fact that the Red Army, not
the Western Allies had liberated Poland, it needed a government that was more accessible and
broadly based on the will of the Polish people. In light of this, the Committee of National
Liberation would invite certain democratic leaders from the London Poles and form a
Provisional Government of Poland. This would then be recognized by the UN and the Great
Powers as the legitimate government of the Polish state. The Provisional government would help
to finalize the decision on German cessions of territory to form Poland’s western border at the
17

future post-war peace conference. As for the final border of the post-war Polish state, the
Curzon Line was definitively and officially stated to be the eastern frontier of Poland.
Throughout the entire conference Stalin had treated Poland’s eastern border as a fait accompli.

18

He was sure that the West would give him the territory he desired, and therefore directed the
majority of the conversation to discussions on Poland’s western border. The only “serious”
challenge to Stalin’s territorial acquisitions was when FDR pressed Stalin for a gesture, to help
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the London Poles save face. FDR requested that the USSR seed Lwow, a city with a Polish
majority east of the Curzon Line, to the Poles. Stalin curtly refused stating that it was the British
who had drawn the Curzon line, not the USSR, and they had left Lwow in Soviet hands.

19

He

failed to mention that at the time of the Curzon Lines creation neither the Poles nor the Soviets
recognized it legitimacy.
In return for the acceptance of the Soviet position, Stalin promised Churchill free
elections not only in Poland but in all of Eastern Europe in accordance with the Atlantic Charter.
In reality the agreement at Yalta included no mechanism for enforcing this promise of free
elections. Molotov managed to remove the language calling for supervised elections from the
20

documents. This meant that the Western Allies trusted the Soviets to honor their promises
without any verification, which gave the USSR a free hand in determining the future government
of the Polish state. In effect, this led to a de-facto recognition of the Lublin Government by the
West, due to the weakness of the agreement’s language, and allowed the Soviets to stretch their
promises to fit any need that might arise.
The London Poles protested the outcome of the Yalta conference vehemently, as shown
in a conversation between the Count Raczynski and Eden on 20 February 1945. In his protest,
Raczynski pointed out that the decisions made at Yalta were taken without Poland’s knowledge
or agreement, an offense so unprecedented that had not even been done to liberated Axis satellite
states such as Romania and Hungary. Yet the offense was not unprecedented, as illustrated by
the Munich Conference of 1938, indeed it had become the custom for the Great Powers to
unilaterally decided the fate of “lesser” nations. Raczynski continued saying that the decision
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was contrary to the declaration made by Churchill on 5 August 1940, and also to several
documented statements by Mr. Eden himself that there would be no territorial changes to Poland
without the agreement of all interested parties. In addition, the result of the Yalta conference was
contrary to statements by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin on their desire for a sovereign and
independent Poland. Raczynski stated definitively that if governance of the Polish nation was left
to the Lublin government, it meant that it would, in fact, be governed by the NKVD. Eden
responded by stating that the decisions arrived at in Yalta were unavoidable in light of the Allies’
overall plan for post-war Europe. In addition, he denied Raczynski’s accusations that Yalta was a
Soviet success, claiming that Stalin had originally pushed for total recognition of the Lublin
government, not a unity party. When pressed on the final composition of the post-war
provisional government, Eden stated that no date had been set for elections.

21

On this point, Stalin was adamant in refusing to admit foreign observers to Poland for any
election or plebiscite that might be held in the future. On 7 April 1945 in a letter to Churchill, he
masked this in an attack on England’s dealings with the new Polish Provisional Government. He
claimed that the provisional government wanted no foreign observers on its soil. Stalin continued
that this was not surprising given the unfriendly attitude the West had adopted toward them in
questioning their (mostly Soviet backed communist) composition. In addition, he stated that the
British government’s attempts to force the provisional government to accept Mr. Mikolajczyk
(the recognized Polish Prime Minister) into the organization when the Prime Minister had
attacked the decisions of Yalta and the provisional government’s forerunner, the Lublin
government, had angered the Committees leaders. Stalin then pointed out that the provisional
government had allowed foreign observers and other parties into their nation from other
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friendlier countries such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Stalin neglected to point out that
22

these were both nations with Soviet imposed communist governments. This lack of effort on
the part of the Allies is often seen as Western acceptance of Eastern Europe falling firmly under
the Soviet sphere of control. Yalta is seen as truly ushering in the era of Soviet dominance that
23

would last fifty years. Through all of this, the London Poles were again excluded from the talks
at Stalin’s insistence, and their objections were brushed aside for political expediency. As a final
blow to their position, the government-in-exile was told by the Allies to join the Lublin
Government in the Party of National Unity, that is, to abandon what they saw as their legitimate
yet unraveling claim as the true government of Poland. Seeing the writing on the wall and hoping
that they would have at least some chance to influence affairs of state, a few of the London Poles
including former Prime Minister Mikołajczyk eventually decided to take up the Soviet offer.
Though publicly and in theory it was stated that they were equal partners in practice, the London
Poles that went east were outnumbered in the party by Soviet backed leftist and were quickly
rendered irrelevant.

24

Yalta proved that by 1945 the Polish issue had become nothing more than a bargaining
chip on the map of post-war Europe. With the war coming to a close, the shape of things to come
was the question on the mind of the Big Three. Each leader had his own agenda; FDR had the
UN, and Churchill had his Anglo-American front against the USSR. Only Stalin was concerned
with the Polish question, i.e. assuring his control over the broken nation. Remarkably, after all
that had happened - after Katyn and the stranding of the Warsaw Uprising - the West still
believed that Stalin would keep his word regarding free elections in the Soviet sphere. Whether it
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was born out of ignorance, naivety, or indifference, Yalta effectively doomed Eastern Europe to
a further five decades of occupation with the hammer and sickle replacing the swastika.

130

CHAPTER VIII
The Price of Victory
Potsdam and Beyond: 1945-1947

With the European war’s end in May 1945, the Polish Government-in-Exile’s world was
collapsing around them. Though the Western Allies entered into the Second World War,
supposedly, to defend Polish national sovereignty, the pre-war Polish government had been
sidelined and replaced by the Western Allies, quick to please Stalin. The West had traded Poland
to Stalin for the promise of stability, just as they had Czechoslovakia to Hitler, the only
difference being the six million Polish dead, including 600,000 that fell fighting for the Allied
1

cause. In a note from Count Raczynski to Eden on 6 July 1945, the London Poles protested the
violation of the rights of Polish nation by the recognition of the Provisional Government of
National Unity by the Three Great Powers. This, coupled with the withdrawal of recognition of
London Poles, represented an unprecedented abandonment of one of Britain’s allies. In response
to a call by the British government to transfer his position to a member of the Polish provisional
government, Raczynski stated he had been made the ambassador by order of the constitutional
government of the Polish Second Republic, and he would not surrender that authority. Raczynski
put forward the fact that the government-in-exile had signed agreements with the United
Kingdom, France, and the United States, as well as numerous multilateral agreements such as the
Atlantic Charter, which prove that they were the legitimate government of the Polish nation. He
went on to state that for the past six years, the Polish Armed Forces had been sacrificing
themselves for the Allied cause under the authority of the London Poles, but at the war’s
victorious conclusion, Poland remained under foreign occupation. Raczynski reminded Eden that
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the Second World War was started to preserve the sovereignty of Poland, and now, even though
Poland found itself on the winning side, the Polish people, were still deprived of their freedom
and independence and were still under the control of hostile alien power. The Lublin
Government had been forced upon Poland and did not represent the will of the Polish people.
Once more in its history, Poland found itself deprived of its independence, but its people, he
stated, resolved to never give up the struggle for liberation. Because of this, Raczynski once
again refused to delegate his authority to the provisional government unless he was ordered to by
the constitutional leaders of the Polish nation: i.e. the government-in-exile.

2

Ignoring the stance of the London Poles, the Three Great Powers met at the Potsdam
Conference in July 1945. Potsdam once again showed how truly unimportant the Polish question
had become as the war had run its course in Europe and was then in its final months in the
Pacific. The world had changed so completely as a result of the war as to make the matter of
Poland a dead issue. The Soviet Union was occupying Central and Eastern Europe with the Red
Army encamped on the border of the Soviet occupation zone of Germany. Refugees were fleeing
out of Eastern Europe fearing the imminent, and in some places well implemented, Stalinist takeover. The United Kingdom had a new Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, who lacked Churchill’s
vehement ant-communist furor, and was far more interested in rebuilding his country and
3

standing up to future Soviet threats than with the all but settled politics of Eastern Europe. The
United States had a new President, Harry Truman, who was also unlike his predecessor. In this
case it was his distrust of the Soviets which set him apart. With the war ending and the Germans
defeated, the usefulness of inter-Allied unity, in regards to the USSR was fading, and the
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American government was becoming much more suspicious of communists than it had been the
4

past decade under FDR. Post-war Germany and East-West cooperation was the main thrust of
the conference. Truman and his advisers saw the Soviets’ actions in Eastern Europe as
aggressive expansionism which was a violation of the agreements Stalin had committed to at
Yalta in February. Stalin insisted that his control of Eastern Europe was a defensive measure
against possible future attacks (by whom he declined to say). Furthermore, he expressed that
Eastern Europe was a legitimate sphere of Soviet influence.

5

In regards to Poland, its fate was a foregone conclusion, its freedom signed away by FDR
at Yalta to gain Soviet acceptance of the UN and support against the Japanese, support that came
6

when Japan was all but defeated by the power of the American’s Atom Bomb. Despite the death
of FDR, with the loss of Churchill, no major leader was willing to use force to defend the
sovereignty of the Polish nation as they had sworn to do in 1939. The most devastating war in
human history had just ended and nobody wished to initiate another one. Even with the power of
the atomic bomb, Truman was unwilling to fight the Soviets for control of Eastern Europe. Six
years of war had been enough for the West, and the Pacific conflict was still raging. Truman
became more concerned with halting further Soviet expansion than with overturning that which
had already taken place. Additionally, he was consumed with assuming leadership of the
Western European bloc that had begun to form in opposition to the USSR after Yalta.
On 8 July 1945 the Western Leaders completed their abandonment of the London Poles
which had begun at Tehran. The Soviet Union flushed with victory on the issue proposed three
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points on issues regarding diplomatic relations with new Polish government and the surrender of
government property held by London Poles. First, the Soviets stated that in view of the
establishment and recognition of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, the Three
Great Powers should immediately sever all relations with the London Poles. Next, the
government-in-exile should transfer all official assets to the new government and the Allies
should forbid the transfer of governmental property and assets to any private person. Not only
would this grant the provisional government the various Polish symbols of office, but would also
grant them access to the finances of the government-in-exile, increasing their claims to
legitimacy while eviscerating the London Poles claim. Finally, the Polish Army, Navy, and Air
Force should immediately subordinate themselves to the authority of the new Polish government
that would then determine any further measures to be taken on the issue (i.e. the return of Polish
servicemen).

7

On 2 August, the concluding communiqué of the Potsdam Conference was issued
containing final resolutions on Polish affairs. The communiqué reads that the decisions made at
Potsdam were joint decisions between the Three Great Powers and served to confirm the
decisions made at the Yalta conference in February 1945. The powers agreed to the
establishment of diplomatic relations with new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity
and the severing of relations with the Polish Government-in-Exile. In addition, the United
Kingdom and the United States would insure measures were taken to protect the interests of
provisional government and would work to obtain property of the Polish state and insure that is
had not been relocated into private hands, pending transfer to the Provisional government. The
communiqué went on to say that the Allies wished to facilitate the return of all Poles abroad that
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desired return to their nation, including servicemen from the Polish Armed Forces and Merchant
Marine. Those who chose to return, it was expected, would be given personal and property rights
on the same basis as all Polish citizens. Finally, the Provisional Government agreed to future,
free, unfettered elections with universal suffrage and a secret ballot. All democratic, anti-Nazi
parties would have the right to take part in such an election and to put forward candidates for
office. The Allied press would also be allowed into the country to report on the process before
and during the elections, a promise that was later denied.

8

The meeting of the Three Great Powers at Potsdam was the final nail in the coffin of the
Polish Second Republic. The portion of the conference on Poland was merely a further
ratification of what had been agreed upon at Yalta. The Three Great Powers, once again without
the presence of the government-in-exile, conclusively established and recognized a Polish
provisional government to be formed in Poland by the Party of National Unity, dominated by the
Lublin Poles, pending future elections. In addition, the meeting finalized the territorial reshaping
of Eastern Europe with the final western boarders of post-war Poland agreed upon, situated on
the Oder-Neisse line.

9

Potsdam and the western border issue can be described as the first instance of Polish10

Soviet unity during the war, though they approached the issue with different motivations. For
the Poles, with the loss of their eastern territory there was a need to make up for it in the West, in
the areas of the medieval Polish Kingdom. For the Soviets, it was an effort to lengthen their
reach further into Western Europe. Additionally, by having the Poles take as much German
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territory as possible, Stalin would ensure that the Poles were forced to ally with the USSR. Who
else could be counted upon to defend the Poles’ new territory in the face of a resurgent German
11

threat? Therefore Stalin pushed for Poland’s border to be as far west as possible, against the
reticence of the Western Allies. In doing so he attempted to show that the Soviets were the Poles
true allies while the West was oriented towards the Germans. The Soviets made ample use of the
West’s near-constant retreat from their promises to the Poles, to capitalize on the Poles’ sense of
resentment and abandonment. The Soviets used the idea of the “Western Betrayal” to prove that
Polish nation could not trust the West in the future and instead should ally with the nation that
“liberated” their country from the German invaders.
Regardless, the Potsdam decision was the final, unequivocal abandonment of the London
Poles by the Western Allies, which would doom Poland to a half century of Soviet oppression.
In effect, the territory of the Polish nation had rolled half of its total area to the west. In doing so,
they lost much of their ancestral heartland from which the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
had drawn much of its wealth and power.
The creation of the various Polish combat units was done with the notion that if the Allies
saw that the Poles were taking an active role in the fighting of the war, they would treat Poland
as a full member of the Allied camp. By war’s end, the Polish Armed Forces represented the
12

fourth largest Allied contingent in the European war. On every front - land, air, and sea wherever the Allies were fighting the Germans, the Poles were there actively participating, many
times playing crucial roles. Yet, all the Poles fighting and dying for the Allied cause did nothing
to save their country as it was sold to the Soviets for vague guaranties. Despite the sacrifices
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made by the Polish fighting men, when the Three Great Powers met to discuss the future of postwar Europe, they did so without the presence of the Polish Government-in-Exile, and forgetting
the thousands of Poles on the war’s front lines.
Indeed, almost as an afterthought, the conference considered the fate of the Polish
soldiers who had been fighting in the West since 1940. The Three Great Powers decided to allow
the Poles in the West to return home to Poland and resettle. The issue was discussed on 13 July
1945 by General Anders and Field Marshal Alexander. In the conversation, Anders begged
Alexander to not force any Pole who wished to stay in the West to return to Poland. Alexander
responded favorably, yet he stated that something like that was a question for Allied Forces
Supreme Headquarters. Anders went on to request that, due to statements of Soviet propaganda,
the refugee camps for the now demobilized Polish servicemen should be British run so that the
13

USSR could not say that Anders had forced any of his 110,000 men to remain in the West. As it
happened, the option to return to Poland was rejected by the vast majority of the Polish
servicemen as many of their homes had been in the eastern territories annexed by the USSR.
Additionally, it was feared that the Soviets would attack the returning soldiers as infected with
Western ideas and therefore dangerous to the USSR’s hold on the nation.
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Map 5. “The Oder-Neisse Line”
Carr, Adam. http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/ commons/9/92/Oder-neisse.gif,(accessed April 1, 2013)

With the Oder-Neisse line decided upon as the Western border of Poland, the large
numbers of Germans in the new Polish territories would have to be removed. The communistbacked Government of National Unity, as well as the Soviet authorities wanted them removed in
order to facilitate a more homogenous Polish nation state mirroring the National Democrat’s
14

position at the creation of the Second Republic. This continuity was latched onto by the
Government of National Unity in an attempt to legitimize themselves in the eyes of the Polish
people. By claiming they were carrying out the same mission as some of the Second Republics
founding figures and its government in the early 1920s, they laid claim to being the legitimate
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successors to the Polish nation, as opposed to the London Poles who they painted as being the
successors to the “fascist” Sanjaca regime.
Over the next six years from 1944 to 1945, over seven million Germans were forcibly
removed from what the new Polish government called, the “recovered territories,” based on the
notion that they had historically belonged to Poland in the medieval period, before German
encroachment to the east.

15

This was accomplished by both legal, i.e. government sponsored, and non-legal, i.e.
16

popular violence and mob justice, methods. The Germans were not the only victims of a forced
exodus. During the same time period, from 1944 to 1946, millions of Poles were forced from
their homes in the eastern portions of pre-war Poland, now under the control of the USSR and
17

split between the Soviet Republics of Belorussia, Ukraine, and Lithuania. Even more troubling,
almost half of the Polish populations in these territories were not allowed to leave; rather they
were forced to retain the Soviet citizenship which had been foisted on them during the Soviet
18

occupation of 1939-1941. Indeed many of the Poles residing in these regions had been drafted
into the Red Army during the course of the war. Perhaps most heartbreaking of all, because they
had been captured by the Soviets during the September campaign and subsequently released after
the signing of the 30 July 1941 Sikorski-Mayski Agreement the majority of the soldiers in the
Polish Armed Forces in the West had come from the eastern areas of Poland. This made the
Polish Provisional Government’s demands that they be forcibly repatriated all the more insulting
15
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as the men in many cases had no home to return to. Indeed, some 30 officers in the Polish II
Corps committed suicide upon learning that their homes had been given to the Soviets.

19

Poland was the nation that lost more of its population and territory than any other state,
while supposedly on the victorious side. Additionally, they had suffered six years of German
occupation and were facing fifty years of Soviet domination. Despite this, they were not to be
given any reparations of their own by the Germans. It was agreed at Potsdam that they would be
20

given only 15% of the Soviet Union’s reparations at Stalin’s insistence. This pitiful amount can
be seen as an effort by Stalin to keep the Poles reliant of the USSR and control what aid Poland
received.
Aside from the death sentence the Second Republic received at the conference, an even
deeper insult to the Poles also arose from Potsdam. In the agreement, the decision was made on
how the Allies were to try the Germans for war crimes. The Germans were to be judged for the
crimes against humanity at a special tribunal and their evil exposed to the world. Yet, sitting in
judgment alongside the Western Allies would be delegates from the USSR, the perpetrators of
innumerable crimes and savageries against the Polish people. As if to add even further insult, the
Soviets then tried to place the blame for the worst of their crimes, Katyn, on the shoulders of the
Germans, as they had been attempting to do since the Germans had first discovered the killing
grounds.

21

Throughout this entire process, the remaining London Poles tried desperately to reason
with the Western leaders. To this end, they issued a statement on 14 August 1945, protesting the
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Potsdam conference on the principles of freedom and equality among the nations of the world.
The statement proclaimed that the secret diplomacy at Potsdam could not be considered a
democratic method of conducting international affairs. The Three Great Powers passed
resolutions affecting other states and arrogated to themselves the exclusive right of organizing
post-war Europe along lines fixed by themselves and themselves alone. The arbitrary method
with which they went about this was particularly striking with regards to Poland. It continued by
saying that the statement from the final communiqué that, “those who chose to return, it was
expected, would be given personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens,”
in light of the arrests and deportations of those Poles the Soviets saw as dangerous to their rule,
was blatantly false. Furthermore, the newly recognized government was nothing but the Lublin
government with the addition of two London Poles who were relegated to the sidelines and held
no actual power; it was not, as stated, an expression of national unity. It was in fact a Polish
Communist Party who received its orders from Moscow, headed by Boleslaw Bierut, a Soviet
citizen and noted Comintern member. In addition, the decisions of the Potsdam conference did
not contain a guarantee of elections, merely a statement that the elections would be held at some
unspecified time at some unspecified place. The statement then reminded the Allies that the
government-in-exile had put forth a plan which stated that the election should be held under
Western supervision after Soviet troops and authorities had left Poland. This plan was rejected
due to pressure from Stalin. In regards to Poland the Potsdam conference amounted to an
inclusion of Poland (the war’s most victimized nation) in the USSR reparations and left the
Polish people at the mercy of the Soviets. All border issues, they said, had fallen in the Soviet’s
favor: the acceptance of the Curzon line, the loss of Lwow, and the Soviet annexation of
Koenigsberg. Finally, the decision had not contained any mention of the release of the sixteen
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Polish leaders being held by USSR. These men had headed the Polish underground through six
years of war and had suffered and fought for the Allied cause along with many others imprisoned
by the Soviets. These heroes had been abandoned by the West out of political expediency. The
position of the Polish Government-in-Exile was that there could be no lasting peace in the world
unless it was based on equality, freedom, justice, and the rule of international law. The legitimate
Polish government would continue to do everything in its power to achieve the triumph of these
22

principles. As usual, their last cries were ignored as the issues, it was explained, had already
been settled.
In the end, Churchill tried to argue that the Polish tragedy was the fault of the
government-in-exile, insisting that had the Poles given into Soviets territorial demands early on
they would have been able to salvaged political control of whatever Polish nation was left.

23

Churchill’s argument disregards one crucial factor, that expansion of Soviet power was the
primary goal of the USSR. The post-war fate of Czechoslovakia proves this point. While the
Soviets argued that Poland needed to be within the Soviet sphere for many reasons, such as its
use as an avenue of invasion into the USSR, its non-Polish minorities, and its historic negative
attitude towards the Russians, none of these rationales applied to the Czechs. Indeed the
democratically-elected Czech President Benes had tried long and hard to establish friendly
relations with the USSR. Yet despite this, when the Soviets had the chance, they conquered
Czechoslovakia, just as they did the rest of Eastern Europe.
The elections long promised by Stalin never materialized, only a fixed referendum in
1946. Even so, the original returns from the polls showed that less than 20 percent of the
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populace voted in favor of the communists. In typical Stalinist fashion, this was changed to show
24

overwhelming support for the Soviet backed government. Despite the obvious foul play
involved in the referendum, it was recognized by the West out of political expediency. The
Western Allies agreed that Poland was not worth fighting a second, potentially more destructive
war over. The time for resisting Stalin’s territorial demands was over. It would have taken a
strong show of force by the Western Allies at the time when Stalin was at his weakest for a
favorable outcome to the Polish question to be wrested from him. Yet throughout the war, Stalin
knew that the West would not attempt such action, due to the value they placed on the Red
Army.
With Stalin now assured the West would not interfere, the process of nationalizing
Poland’s economy began, and the start of land reform was implemented. Additionally, Soviet
authorities started the transfer of Poland to a single party Soviet state. All right wing parties were
outlawed, leaving no choice in future elections except for the state-sponsored party. Opposition
leaders were rounded up and executed after show trials or exiled far to the east. Resistance was
brutally put down, and members of the Home Army, still fighting the same fight they began in
25

1939, were routed out and destroyed. Foreign states began to recognize the new communist
government as the legitimate government of Poland, and the government-in-exile was evicted
26

from the Polish consulate in London. The same process was repeating itself all over Eastern
Europe as the Iron Curtin began to descend across the continent. The Allies’ indifference to the
Soviets actions in Eastern Europe sealed its fate for the next half century. Had Truman reacted to
Stalin’s violations of Yalta in the east, as he did later in the case of Communist incursions into
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Turkey and Greece, the Soviets may have had no choice but to honor their promise of free
elections rather than risk a confrontation with the West.

27

Instead Stalin violated his promises

from the Atlantic Charter, Yalta, and Potsdam, while the West, seeing Poland as a lost cause,
moved on to the next battlefield of the Cold War.
With the European conflict at an end, the conference at Potsdam showed that the issue of
Poland was dead-on-arrival. The decision as to Poland’s future had been hammered out at Yalta
months before; Potsdam merely made the deal official. Despite the change in leadership from the
open FDR to the suspicious anticommunist Truman, the concern was with the looming Cold
War, not in trying to wrest Poland back to the western side of the Iron Curtin. Within months,
Stalin’s promises were shown to be worthless in rigged elections, NKVD arrests, and show trials
all over Europe. For Poland, the occupation continued with great forced migrations of peoples
and the territory of the Polish nation itself to the West. The Polish soldiers, sailors, and airmen in
the West had, it seemed, been fighting and sacrifice for their Allies’ freedom, not theirs, as they
were left nationless and forgotten. The government-in-exile, a hollow shell of what it had been
even in 1940, pledged to remain and keep the torch burning, but already the governments of the
world were recognizing the council from Lublin as the legitimate voice of the Polish people.
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Conclusion

As this thesis has demonstrated, the Second Polish Republic was in many ways doomed
from the start. Reestablished in November 1918, after 123 years of foreign domination, it lay
isolated in Eastern Europe between its two large and powerful traditional foes. The hostility of
Germany and the USSR, coupled with the precariousness of the Poles’ newly-won independence,
left few options for the Poles’ survival. The Second Republic therefore spent its twenty-year
existence searching for a place on the European stage while seeking legitimacy as a Great Power
both at home and abroad.
From the beginning, there were arguments about the borders of a Polish state and how it
should fit into the framework of Europe. Pilsudski’s Intermarium federation vied with
Dmowski’s Polish nation state, but due to wars, treaties, and infighting, the Second Republic fell
in between the two concepts, and in the process, failed to accomplish either. The unstable politics
of the Second Republic were a byproduct of the attempt to form a functioning state from the
remnants of three empires after more than a century of foreign domination, magnified by the
treacherousness of the Poles’ position in Europe. The Polish Sejm’s inability to reconcile these
problems, combined with insufficient time to establish a culture of democracy within Poland,
resulted in the nation turning to authoritarianism to ensure its economic and diplomatic security.
Pilsudski’s coup in May 1926, and the subsequent Sanacja government did much to strengthen
the inner workings of the Polish nation, but at the cost of foreign disapproval, harming the
standing of not only the Polish government but also the Polish state. The Marshal’s death in 1935
and the loss of his guiding hand left Poland’s government adrift, causing it to shift further
towards open authoritarianism. The Second Republic’s foreign policy mirrored their internal
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struggles. Based on a misguided view of their own strength and importance to their allies,
Pilsudski and subsequently Beck’s policy of equilibrium could not stand without secure
guaranties from the Western powers that were content to give in to Hitler’s demands rather than
risk war. Every instance of Western appeasement to Hitler was a crack in the foundation of the
Poles’ foreign policy.
The outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939, revealed how the Poles’
inter-war efforts to establish themselves within the “concert of Europe” failed. Used by the
Western Allies and the Soviets alike to buy time for their own inevitable conflict with Hitler, the
inauguration of the conflict proved the beginning of the end for the Second Republic. The new
Polish Government-in-Exile was formed primarily from the pre-war opposition to Sanacja, who,
while claiming to represent the original government of the Second Republic, were a break with
the regime that Pilsudski had instituted in 1926. Therefore their actions during the war embodied
an attempt to legitimize their claims by lending all the support at their disposal to the Allied
cause. Half a million Polish servicemen fought and died to ensure Poland’s survival after the
defeat of the Nazi Germany. Yet, the Poles’ sacrifices were undermined in one fell swoop by the
entry of the Soviet Union into the Allied war effort in June 1941. In comparison with the strength
of the Red Army, all of the Poles’ contributions shrank into obscurity.
Yet above all else, Stalin’s demands proved a death sentence to the Second Republic.
From the beginning of the war, Stalin’s goal had been the annexation of Polish territory, be it
through an agreement with Hitler, the Western Allies, or by brute force. As the conflict dragged
on, his aim changed to the total political control of not only Poland, but the whole of Eastern
Europe. Stalin’s actions, his murder of the Polish officer corps at Katyn, his obstinacy in the
forming of the Polish II Corps, his creation of the Lublin Committee, and his complacency in the
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failure of the Warsaw Uprising all offer clear evidence that in the latter half of the conflict, the
USSR was striving for control of Poland and all of Eastern Europe in the post-war world. The
Polish Government-in-Exile’s resistance to Stalin’s plans engendered resentment on the part of
the Western Allies, desperate for Soviet aid against the Germans, causing them to see the
London Poles as inconvenient and obstinate. Stalin in the negotiations at the Tehran, Yalta, and
Potsdam conferences demanded concessions from the Poles and the Western Allies unilaterally
granted them. When the time came, they were willing to sacrifice the London Poles to appease
Stalin and ensure his continued pledge to inter-allied Unity and the armed struggle to defeat
Nazism.
The government-in-exile, still grappled with the problem of legitimacy inherited from its
pre-war predecessors. Its continued inability to establish itself with the current framework
allowed the West to come-to-terms with transferring legitimacy, along with the Polish nation,
from the London Poles to Stalin’s Committee of National Unity. Despite the fact that Polish
soldiers, sailors, and airmen had been instrumental in the Allies’ success, by war’s end Stalin had
achieved his goal of a Poland which took its orders from Moscow. By this means, Poland had
finally found its “legitimate” place on the European stage, though not at the hands of the Second
Republic. Rather, for the next half century, the position of the People’s Republic of Poland
would be defined by an alliance with the USSR and a place within the Soviet sphere.
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